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Abstract. In the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv problem of demand for insurance contracts, it is well-
known that the optimal insurance contract for an insurance buyer – or decision maker (DM) – is a
deductible contract, when the insurer is a risk-neutral Expected-Utility (EU) maximizer, and when
the DM is a risk-averse EU-maximizer. In the Arrow-Borch-Raviv framework, however, both parties
share the same probabilistic beliefs about the realizations of the underlying insurable loss. This paper
argues for heterogeneity of beliefs in the classical insurance model, and considers a setting where the
DM and the insurer have preferences yielding different subjective beliefs. The DM seeks the insur-
ance contract that will maximize her (subjective) expected utility of terminal wealth with respect to
her subjective probability measure, whereas the insurer sets premiums on the basis of his subjective
probability measure. I show that in this setting, and under a consistency requirement on the insurer’s
subjective probability that I call vigilance, there exists an event to which the DM assigns full (sub-
jective) probability and on which an optimal insurance contract for the DM takes the form of what
I will call a generalized deductible contract. Moreover, the class of all optimal contracts for the DM
that are nondecreasing in the loss is fully characterized in terms of their distribution under the DM’s
probability measure. Finally, the assumption of vigilance is shown to be a weakening of the assumption
of a monotone likelihood ratio, when the latter can be defined, and it is hence a useful tool in situations
where the likelihood ratio cannot be defined.
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1. Introduction
The problem of demand for insurance contracts has become part of the folklore of economic theory,
as it were, and unequivocally one of the cornerstones of actuarial thought. From the outset, the
problem was studied within the framework of Expected-Utility Theory (EUT), as in the seminal work
of Arrow [3], Borch [14], and Raviv [45], where it was shown that full insurance above a deductible
is optimal for the DM when the premium principle depends on the actuarial value (expected value)
of the indemnity, when the decision maker (DM) is a risk-averse Expected-Utility (EU) Maximizer,
and when both the DM and the insurer share the same probabilistic beliefs about the realization of a
given insurable loss. These foundational results were then extended in several directions, all the while
maintaining the assumption of homogeneity of beliefs1.
This homogeneity of beliefs is a consequence of the objectivity of the underlying uncertainty, in the
sense that likelihoods are given independently of the preferences of the parties involved. Indeed, in
the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv approach, the insurable loss is taken to be a (nonnegative) random
variable X on a given probability space pΩ,G, P q, where the probability measure P is independent of
the preferences of both the DM and the insurer. This classical formulation of the insurance demand
problem is essentially due to Arrow [3], and is a heritage of the von Neumann and Morgenstern (vNM)
[55] approach to the definition of uncertainty and decision under uncertainty, where an individual’s
preferences are over a collection of objective lotteries. “Objectivity” is to be understood here as the fact
that likelihoods are given exogenously to the individuals’ choice problem and independently of their
preferences. This framework guarantees de facto a perfect homogeneity of beliefs, since probabilities
are totally objective and hence common to all parties involved.
Regardless of the way uncertainty is formulated, the case can also be made for an assumption of
homogeneity of beliefs in an insurance model relying only on Aumann’s [4] celebrated Agreement Theo-
rem, within the differential information approach (or information-structure approach) to the formation
of beliefs initially introduced by Aumann. The Agreement Theorem roughly states that when two
parties share a common prior belief, and when their posterior beliefs2 are common knowledge3, then
these posterior beliefs must coincide. In this sense, two individuals having the same prior cannot agree
to disagree, when the information is completely shared, and hence disagreement about probabilities
must vanish.
To see how the Agreement Theorem can be incorporated into the Arrow-Borch-Raviv insurance
model, suppose that before engaging in the problem of selecting an insurance contract, that is at a
stage prior to the problem under consideration, both the insurer and the DM have the opportunity
to formulate prior beliefs about the realizations of the insurable loss. Once they receive some relevant
information, both parties proceed to updating their beliefs based on this information, hence yielding
their posterior beliefs. They then engage in the insurance activity based on these posterior beliefs.
If an epistemic foundation for the theory of insurance demand were to be rooted in the Agreement
Theorem, then homogeneity of (posterior) beliefs can be obtained automatically as a consequence of
both (i) common prior beliefs about the realization of the insurable loss, and, (ii) complete sharing of
relevant information so that posterior beliefs become common knowledge. However, as soon as either
(i), or (ii), or both fail to hold, there would be no rationale for the assumption of homogeneous beliefs
in the classical insurance model, at least as far as the information-structure approach is concerned.
1See [23, p. 59] for a brief survey.
2Obtained by Bayesian updating of the priors.
3In Aumann’s framework, an event is said to be common knowledge if both individuals know it, if each individual
knows that the other individual knows it, if each individual knows that other individuals knows that the former knows
it, and so on.
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After reviewing the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv model, I will argue that heterogeneity of beliefs in
insurance markets is, on a practical level, a very natural assumption, and, on a theoretical level, an
assumption that is as justified as that of belief homogeneity. The argument is based on a criticism of
the Common Priors Assumption (CPA); a criticism of the the assumption that posteriors are common
knowledge, or that information is totally shared; the spirit of the Wilson Doctrine; and, a criticism of
the objective approach to uncertainty.
I then consider an insurance model in the spirit of the Arrow-Borch-Raviv model, with the ex-
ception that the DM and the insurer are allowed to entertain different subjective beliefs about the
realization of the insurable loss. I adopt a decision-theoretic approach to belief formation and rely on
the heterogeneity of preferences as a proxy for the heterogeneity of (subjective) beliefs. Both agents
are Subjective Expected-Utility (SEU) maximizers, with different subjective probability measures. I
do not assume that the DM’s actions influence the realization of the random loss under consideration.
The model considered does not allow for moral hazard or for information asymmetry. Rather, it allows
only for belief asymmetry, and the rest is identical to the Arrow-Borch-Raviv setup.
I introduce a consistency requirement on the subjective probability measure of the insurer with
respect to that of the DM that I call vigilance, and I show that if this condition holds, then the DM’s
demand problem admits a solution Y˚ which is a nondecreasing function of the underlying loss X,
and which has the same distribution (for her subjective probability measure) as a function of the form
(1.1) Z :“ min
«
X,max
´
0,X ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
pλ˚hq
ı¯ﬀ
for some λ˚ ě 0 and a nonnegative measurable function h which is entirely characterized from the
subjective probabilities of both parties (Theorem 6.2 on p. 17). The function u is the DM’s utility
function,W0 is the DM’s initial level of wealth, and Π is the premium paid by the DM, as in the Arrow-
Borch-Raviv model. Moreover, any other indemnity schedule which is a nondecreasing function of the
underlying loss and which has the same distribution as Y˚ for the DM is almost surely equal to Y˚ (for
the DM’s probability measure). The monotonicity of an insurance indemnity schedule is usually desired
so as to eliminate ex post moral hazard issues that might arise from the DM’s possible misreporting
of the actual amount of the loss suffered. Furthermore, and almost surely for the DM, an optimal
indemnity scheme takes the form of a generalized deductible contract, defined hereafter (Corollary 6.3
on p. 18). In particular, a generalized deductible contract includes a deductible provision, whereby
the insurer will not compensate losses of an amount lesser than a given threshold (the deductible).
Also, when the beliefs of both parties coincide, the function h appearing in eq. (1.1) is the constant
function equal to 1, and hence the function Z is simply a deductible contract, which is a nondecreasing
function of the loss X. In this case, the main result of this paper (Theorem 6.2 on p. 17) boils down
to the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv result (Theorem 2.2 on p. 6).
The vigilance condition is a probabilistic consistency requirement on the insurer’s subjective belief
with respect to the DM’s subjective belief. In particular, vigilance is trivially satisfied in the case of
perfect homogeneity of beliefs, since it will be apparent from the definition of vigilance that any prob-
ability measure is vigilant with respect to itself. Vigilance can be interpreted as a kind of credibility
that the insurer gives to the DM’s assessment of the riskiness of a given insurance contract, and of
its variability as a function of the underlying loss. Indeed, heuristically, one can think of an insurance
scheme Y “ I pXq as having two sources of “randomness”: a baseline randomness associated with
the state space itself, that is, with the variability of Y with the state of nature; and, an idiosyncratic
randomness associated with the variability of Y with the loss X itself, that is, the variability of the
4 MARIO GHOSSOUB
function I with respect to the identity function4. Baseline randomness is belief-specific, in the sense
that it depends on the distribution of X, whereas idiosyncratic randomness is belief-free. Vigilance
of the insurer’s belief with respect to the DM’s belief can then be intuitively understood as requiring
that, for a given baseline randomness fixed according to the DM’s belief, a comparison of the overall
riskiness of two contracts from the point of view of the insurer can be restricted to a comparison of
their idiosyncratic randomness only. Moreover, it will be understood that for two functions I and
J , if function I’s variability is similar to that of the identity function Id (that is, I is comonotonic
with Id), then less idiosyncratic risk is attributed to I than to J . This is tantamount to a kind of
credibility that the insurer gives to the DM’s probabilistic assessment of the riskiness of a contract.
Vigilance is simply a consistency requirement on two different probability measures. When the
beliefs of the DM and the insurer are such that one can define probability density functions (pdf-s)
for the loss X, then another well-known probabilistic consistency requirement that could be imposed
on the agents’ beliefs is the monotone likelihood ratio condition (MLR). The MLR simply assumes
that the ratio of the pdf-s is a monotone function (either nonincreasing or nondecreasing, depending
on how the ratio is taken). I will show that the assumption of vigilance is (strictly) weaker than the
MLR, which is commonly used in economics. Vigilance can then serve as substitute for, and as a
weakening of the MLR in situations where a likelihood ratio can be defined, and it can be seen as a
useful extension of the MLR to situations where densities do not exist and hence a likelihood ratio
cannot be defined.
Related Literature. Notwithstanding the Harsa´nyi Doctrine, that is the idea that disagreements
about probabilities result only from difference in information, one should be cautious not to confound
a problem of belief heterogeneity in an insurance model with a problem of information asymmetry.
Problems of information asymmetry in insurance markets were usually studied in the context of adverse
selection or moral hazard. The classical setup of adverse selection in insurance markets (e.g. [46, 53])
considers a risk-neutral EU-maximizing insurer and two types of risk-averse EU-maximizing insurees:
a high-risk type (h) and a low risk-type (l). There are only two states of the world: an accident state
and a no-accident state. An insurable loss X then takes the value 0 with a probability 1 ´ pi, for
i “ h, l, and a fixed value L ą 0 with probability pi. However, for each risk type i, both the insurer
and the i-type insured have perfectly homogeneous beliefs, in that they both assign the distribution
pL, pi; 0, 1 ´ piq to the loss. In this framework, “information asymmetry” refers to the fact that the
type of the insured is private information, not the insured’s perception of the loss distribution. In
insurance models with moral hazard (e.g. [2, 52, 54]), there is risk-neutral EU-maximizing insurer, a
risk-averse EU-maximizing insured, and a two-state world (accident and no-accident) where the loss
X can take a value L ą 0 (in case of accident), with a known probability pe that depends on the
insured’s effort (e) in preventing the loss. In the no-accident state, the loss takes the value 0 with
probability 1 ´ pe. However, both the insurer and the insured have perfectly homogeneous beliefs
at each effort level. That is, for a given effort level e, both the insurer and the insured assign the
distribution pL, pe; 0, 1 ´ peq to the loss. In this framework, “information asymmetry” refers to the
fact that the effort level of the insured is private information, not the insured’s perception of the loss
distribution for a given effort level.
Although the effect of heterogeneity of beliefs in an insurance market on the shape of an optimal
contract is a very natural problem to examine, in light of the previous discussion, this problem was
by and far left open. The only two exceptions that I am aware of are Marshall [41] and Jeleva and
Villeneuve [39]. The latter extend the two-state adverse selection model of Stiglitz [53] to account for
4Indeed, if Id denotes the identity function on the range of X, then the insurance scheme Y0 “ X “ Id ˝X can be
interpreted as the reference point for idiosyncratic randomness, i.e. randomness with respect to the loss X itself.
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belief heterogeneity. In their framework, for each type of insured, the insurer and the insured have
different beliefs about the probability of the loss taking the positive value L. Although the authors
give an interesting analysis, one might argue that the two-state framework is of limited interest for
at least two reasons: (i) typically, financial and insurance risks are not binary risks as in the two-
state model; and (ii) assuming the classical constraint that an indemnity I pXq be nonnegative and
not larger than the loss itself, a two-state model where the loss X has a distribution pL, p; 0, 1 ´ pq
cannot determine the shape of the optimal indemnity schedule. For instance, the indemnity can be a
deductible contract of the form I pXq “ max pX ´ d, 0q :“ pX ´ dq`, for some d ě 0. Indeed, in the
no-accident state, the loss is 0, and so the indemnity is 0. In the accident state, the loss is L ą 0, and
so the indemnity is N , for some N P p0, Ls. Letting d “ L´N ě 0, one can then write the indemnity
as I pXq “ pX ´ dq`. However, the indemnity can also be of the coinsurance type, i.e. of the form
I pXq “ αX, for some α P p0, 1s. Indeed, in the no-accident state, the loss is 0, and so the indemnity
is 0. In the accident state, the loss is L ą 0, and so the indemnity is N , for some N P p0, Ls. Letting
α “ N{L, one can then write the indemnity as I pXq “ αX.
Marshall [41] (hereafter, Marshall) considers a more general setup than that of Jeleva and Villeneuve
[39], but remains restrictive nonetheless. The way in which the heterogeneity of beliefs is introduced
in Marshall’s insurance model is very specific: the DM (Marshall refers to this agent as “the client”)
assigns a probability density function (pdf) f ptq to the insurable loss, whereas the insurer attributes
the pdf g ptq to the loss. Moreover, conditional on the event that the loss is nonzero, fptq and gptq
agree. However, the probability of a zero loss is higher for the DM than for the insurer. This is a very
restrictive approach to belief heterogeneity, since this heterogeneity is reduced only to the likelihood
that each party attaches to the event of zero loss. In Section 5.3, I will examine Marshall’s setup
in more detail and show how it can be reduced to a particular case of the model proposed in this
paper. In particular, I will show that the assumptions made in the setting of Marshall imply a form
of vigilance.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, I review the Arrow-Borch-Raviv model.
In Section 3, I argue for the introduction of heterogeneity of beliefs into the Arrow-Borch-Raviv model.
In Section 4, I introduce the formal model of insurance demand in the presence of belief heterogeneity.
Section 5 is dedicated to the notion of vigilance. In Section 6, the DM’s problem of demand for
insurance coverage is examined, and the main results of this paper (Theorem 6.2 and Corollary 6.3)
are stated. Section 7 concludes. All proofs, and some related analysis are collected in the Appendices.
The supplement to this paper contains some extensions of this paper’s results and of the techniques
used in the proofs of this paper’s results. The supplement also illustrates how the idea of vigilance
can be used to obtain a general monotone comparative statics result in a setting of heterogeneous
uncertainty.
2. The Classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv Model
The Arrow-Borch-Raviv model starts with a given random loss, modeled as an essentially bounded
nonnegative random variable X on some exogenously given probability space pΩ,G, P q. A DM seeks an
insurance coverage against this random loss she is facing, and the market gives the DM the opportunity
to purchase a coverage I from an insurer, for a premium Π set by the latter. Both the DM and the
insurer are assumed to know what the distribution of X is and to agree on this distribution, in the
sense that both assign to X the law P ˝X´1 on the range D Ď R` of X. The insurance coverage is
modeled as a Borel-measurable mapping I : D Ñ R`, and D is typically assumed to take the form
r0,M s, for some M ă `8. Moreover, the insurer is assumed to be a risk-neutral EU-maximizer, and
the DM is assumed to be a strictly risk-averse EU-maximizer, with a strictly increasing, concave, and
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twice continuously differentiable utility function u. The DM has an initial wealth of amount W0, and
her wealth in state ω P Ω is given by
W pωq :“W0 ´Π´X pωq ` I pX pωqq
The DM’s demand problem is to find the indemnity I˚ that will maximize her expected utility of
wealth, subject to a feasibility constraint and a premium constraint. Formally, the problem is the
following:
Problem 2.1. For a given loading factor ρ ą 0,
sup
I
"ż
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` I ˝X
¯
dP
*
:"
0 ď I ˝X ď X
Π ě p1` ρq
ş
I ˝X dP
The first constraint is standard (see Arrow [3] and Raviv [45]), and says that an indemnity is
nonnegative and cannot exceed the loss itself. The latter requirement simply rules out situations
where the DM has an incentive to create damage (see Huberman, Mayers and Smith [37]), which would
yield to ex-post moral hazard. The second constraint is simply the insurer’s participation constraint,
restated as a premium constraint. The classical literature has studied Problem 2.1 extensively, and
it was shown that the solution is given by a deductible contract (e.g. [3, p. 212] or [45, Corollary
1]). Figure 1 below illustrates the shape of a deductible contract, in comparison with a full insurance
contract.
Theorem 2.2 (Arrow-Borch-Raviv). There exists some d ą 0 such that pId ˝Xq is optimal for
Problem 2.1, where Id is a deductible contract defined by:
Id ptq “
"
0 if t ă d
t´ d if t ě d
That is, an optimal solution for Problem 2.1 takes the form Y ˚ “ min
”
X,max p0,X ´ dq
ı
, for
some d ą 0.
The objectivity of the probability space pΩ,F , P q means that the probability measure P is not
determined from the preferences of the parties involved, and it hence cannot be a reflection of the
subjective beliefs of the insurer and the DM. In this classical approach, both parties completely agree
on the likelihoods attached to the different realizations of the underlying insurable loss, as measured
by the objective probability measure P . In this sense, the uncertainty inherent in the insurable loss
is assumed to be totally objective, a priori. While Aumann’s [4] Agreement Theorem might give a
justification for such an assumption, as was argued earlier, instances of divergence of beliefs are the
most interesting ones to examine in practice, and the more realistic. The next section also gives some
theoretical justifications for the introduction of belief heterogeneity into the classical Arrow-Borch-
Raviv framework.
3. The Case for Heterogeneity of Beliefs in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv Model
As stated earlier, one might give two justifications for the assumption of homogeneity of beliefs in
the Arrow-Borch-Raviv model. The first relies on the specific formulation of the idea of uncertainty
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(b) A deductible insurance contract
Figure 1. Full insurance above a deductible.
introduced by von Neumann and Morgenstern [55], whereby uncertainty is an “objective” concept,
given prior to, and independently of an individual’s preferences over the objects of choice. The second
justification relies on Aumann’s [4] information model and the Agreement Theorem: if the DM and the
insurer have common prior beliefs, and if relevant information is shared, then the parties’ posterior
beliefs must coincide. This then suggests a three-fold argument for the heterogeneity of beliefs in
insurance markets:
(a) first, a criticism of the CPA;
(b) second, a criticism of the the assumption that posteriors are common knowledge, or that
information is totally shared; and,
(c) third, a criticism of the objectivity of the underlying uncertainty, a view that is inherited from
the vNM approach and heavily challenged by subjectivist Bayesianism.
The CPA and the Harsa´nyi Doctrine. In a series of groundbreaking papers, Harsa´nyi [34, 35, 36]
introduced the idea – which came to be known as the Harsa´nyi Doctrine – that any disagreement
about probabilities must be solely a result of difference in information. As Aumann [5] puts it:
“[P]eople with different information may legitimately entertain different probabilities,
but there is no rational basis for people who have always been fed precisely the same
information to do so.”
Aumann’s [4] Agreement Theorem can be viewed as a formalization of the Harsn´ayi Doctrine. In
light of the Agreement Theorem, the Harsa´nyi Doctrine is equivalent to an assumption of common
priors, but this is only one of the numerous reasons why the CPA has become so widespread; and,
indeed, many fundamental results in economic theory are dependent on it5. Morris [43] gives an
5For instance, no-trade results a` la Milgrom and Stokey [42] and Sebenius and Geanakoplos [51]; or results a` la Aumann
[5] and Aumann and Brandenburger [7] that aim at giving a decision-theoretic foundation of equilibrium reasoning in
games.
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excellent and still timely review and criticism of the CPA. The now famous Gul-Aumann [31, 6]
exchange is also a debate over the validity of the CPA. It is not the object of this paper to partake in
such a debate, but merely to draw attention to it, for by its very being it ought to serve as an indication
that there might be reasonable grounds for abandoning the CPA altogether. After all, even Aumann
[6] himself writes that the CPA “embodies a reasonable and useful approach to interactive decision
problems, though by no means the only such approach.” Once the CPA is abandoned, heterogeneity
of (prior and hence posterior) beliefs is obtained naturally.
Common Knowledge of Posteriors and theWilson Doctrine. The second tenet of the information-
structure justification of the assumption of belief homogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv framework,
based on Aumann’s [4] Agreement Theorem, is the assumption of common knowledge of posteriors.
When exactly can such common knowledge exist? One obvious case, in light of the Agreement Theo-
rem, is that when the two agents have common priors and different posteriors, then they cannot have
common knowledge of these posteriors. However, when this happens, heterogeneity of (posterior)
beliefs is given by assumption, and this is precisely the case that is the object of this paper. Whether
or not posterior beliefs are common knowledge becomes irrelevant.
In less trivial situations, Halpern and Moses [32] show that when communication is not guaranteed,
common knowledge cannot be attained, and, indeed, common knowledge will not be achieved in many
cases of interest. They also show that, even if communication is guaranteed, common knowledge
cannot be attained if there is no time limit for messages to be delivered. Recently, Lehrer and Samet
[40] examined instances where it is impossible in principle (not incidentally) for two agents to have
common knowledge of their (posterior) beliefs, regardless of their priors. At any rate, dropping the
assumption of common knowledge of posteriors seems to be equally justified as maintaining it.
On another level, one might argue for relaxing the assumption of common knowledge in an effort
to espouse what has come to be known as the Wislon Doctrine, which is expressed in this quote from
Wilson [56]:
“Game theory has a great advantage in explicitly analyzing the consequences of trad-
ing rules that presumably are really common knowledge; it is deficient to the extent
it assumes other features to be common knowledge, such as one agents probability as-
sessment about anothers preferences or information. r. . .s I foresee the progress of
game theory as depending on successive reduction in the base of common knowledge
required to conduct useful analyses of practical problems. Only by repeated weakening
of common knowledge assumptions will the theory approximate reality.”
There has been a movement in economic theory, in the past 10 years or so, towards incorporating the
Wilson Doctrine, or some reinterpretation thereof, into the formulation of many theoretical problems,
especially in problems of mechanism design6. In the Arrow-Borch-Raviv model, the Wilson Doctrine
then stipulates that one should endeavour to relax the assumption of common knowledge among both
parties. This will then lead to dropping the assumption of homogeneous (posterior) beliefs.
Subjective Uncertainty and Personal Probability. The approach to uncertainty in economic
theory at large, and especially in decision theory, has been in constant modification since the work of
vNM [55], which defines uncertainty as totally objective. A sate-of-affairs where different individuals
may entertain different beliefs regarding the realizations of an underlying uncertainty is de facto left
out of consideration. However, the idea that uncertainty can be totally objective has been severely
6See Bergemann and Morris [8, 9, 10, 11], or Chung and Ely [18], for instance.
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criticized in decision theory7, starting from the advocates of a personal view of probability, such as
De Finetti [20], Ramsey [44], and especially Savage [49]. Contrary to the vNM approach, Savage
formulates uncertainty in the objects of choice without objectively given probabilities. Beliefs and
likelihoods are then derived from preferences, and probabilities are hence subjective, in the sense that
the individual’s preferences over the acts of choice induce a (unique) subjective probability measure
representing the individual’s beliefs. I am not concerned here with the philosophical questioning of
this purely subjective approach to probability. My intent is merely to draw attention to the fact that
the personalistic view of probability is by now a well-established foundational view of belief formation,
and that some of its proponents feel very strongly that this ought to be the only approach to the idea
of probability. Suffice it to quote Savage [49] who writes:
“[T]he concept of personal probability [...] is [...] the only probability concept essential
to science and other activities that call upon probability.”
More passionately, De Finetti [21] writes:
“The abandonment of superstitious belief about [...] Fairies and Witches [...] was
an essential step along the road to scientific thinking. Probability, too, if regarded
as something endowed with some kind of objective existence, is no less a misleading
misconception, an illusory attempt to exteriorize or materialize our true probabilistic
beliefs. [...] Probabilistic reasoning – always to be understood as subjective – merely
stems from our being uncertain about something. It makes no difference whether the
uncertainty relates to an unforeseeable future, or to an unnoticed past, or to a past
doubtfully reported or forgotten [...] The only relevant thing is uncertainty – the extent
of our knowledge and ignorance. The actual fact of whether or not the events con-
sidered are in some sense determined, or known by other people, and so on, is of no
consequence.”
This subjectivist view of probability seems to be inconsistent with an assumption of common priors,
given that the preferences of different agents typically differ. Consequently, as soon as one is willing to
accept a purely personalistic view of uncertainty and belief formation, the heterogeneity of (subjective)
beliefs arises then naturally as a consequence of the heterogeneity of preferences. Incidentally, the
latter seems to be a rather uncontroversial assumption in economic theory.
Introducing Belief Heterogeneity into the Arrow-Borch-Raviv Model. The arguments pre-
sented above show that there are reasonable grounds for rejecting either (i) an assumption of common
priors, or (ii) an assumption of common knowledge of posteriors, or both. When either (i), or (ii),
or both are rejected, the Agreement Theorem cannot guarantee homogeneity of posterior beliefs.
Consequently, belief heterogeneity can very well exist between the insurer and the DM.
Furthermore, on a practical level, the assumption of a common prior is a strong assumption in the
insurance framework, and it is hardly justifiable in practice. Often, an insurer has far more experience
with a particular kind of insurable loss than a DM does, for having encountered the same kind of
loss in previous dealings with different insurees, for instance. The DM, on the other hand, may be
a novice when facing this particular loss against which an insurance coverage is sought. One cannot
then expect both parties to formulate identical prior beliefs about the uncertain loss. Moreover, even
if both parties are assumed to have common priors, an assumption of complete information sharing is
very strong and rather unrealistic. In practice, sharing information is costly and time-consuming, and
7The debate over the objectivity or subjectivity of probabilistic beliefs is also vivid in epistemology and the philosophy
of science, especially in what might be called the philosophical foundations of probability theory.
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hence typically uncared for. Therefore, practical considerations of the very nature of the insurance
market leads one to deem conditions (i) and (ii) stated above as inapplicable, and hence no grounds
for the assumption of homogeneous beliefs can be reasonably given. Additionally, as discussed above,
heterogeneity of beliefs can be taken as a natural inherent characteristic of the insurance model, in
keeping with the spirit of the Wilson Doctrine.
Moreover, it was argued that the conception of uncertainty inherent in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv
insurance model is a heritage of the objectivist approach to uncertainty, championed by von Neumann
and Morgenstern (vNM) [55]. I see no reason why uncertainty should be perceived only in this fashion,
especially that the subjectivist tradition of Ramsey-De Finetti-Savage has proven to be very fruitful
in economic theory. As soon as a subjectivist approach to uncertainty in adopted, whereby beliefs are
the personal probabilities determined from preferences, belief heterogeneity in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv
model would be obtained naturally as a consequence of the heterogeneity of preferences. One can then
consider that heterogeneity of beliefs is an inherent trait of insurance markets, and is a very natural
state-of-affairs.
4. An Insurance Model with Heterogeneous Beliefs
4.1. Setup. Let S denote the set of states of the world. The DM faces a loss X, taken to be a
mapping of S onto a closed interval r0,M s, for some M ă `8. In particular, there are states of
the world in which the loss takes a zero value, that is, ts P S : X psq “ 0u ‰ ∅. The DM seeks an
insurance coverage against this loss. Henceforth, I will denote by Σ the σ-algebra σtXu of subsets of
S generated by the random loss X.
Denote by B pΣq the supnorm-normed Banach space of all bounded, R-valued and Σ-measurable
functions on pS,Σq, and denote by B` pΣq the collection of all R`-valued elements of B pΣq. For
any Y P B pΣq, the supnorm of Y is given by }Y }s :“ supt|Y psq| : s P Su ă `8. Then by Doob’s
measurability theorem [1, Theorem 4.41], for any Y P B pΣq there exists a Borel-measurable map
ζ : RÑ R such that Y “ ζ ˝X. For C Ď S, denote by 1C the indicator function of C. For any A Ď S
and for any B Ď A, denote by AzB the complement of B in A.
Definition 4.1. Two functions Y1, Y2 P B pΣq are said to be comonotonic if”
Y1 psq ´ Y1
`
s1
˘ ı”
Y2 psq ´ Y2
`
s1
˘ ı
ě 0, for all s, s1 P S
For instance any Y P B pΣq is comonotonic with any c P R. Moreover, if Y1, Y2 P B pΣq, and if Y2 is
of the form Y2 “ I ˝ Y1, for some Borel-measurable function I, then Y2 is comonotonic with Y1 if and
only if the function I is nondecreasing.
The insurance market gives the DM the possibility of entering into an insurance contract with the
insurer. Such a contract is represented by a pair pΠ, Iq, where Π ą 0 is the premium paid by the DM
in return of the indemnity I. The indemnity is a Borel-measurable map I : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s, such
that 0 ď I pX psqq ď X psq for all s P S. Then Y :“ I ˝X P B` pΣq, Y ď X, and Y psq “ 0 for all
s P ts P S : X psq “ 0u, that is, I p0q “ 0.
Most of the assumptions that will be made here are for the sake of comparison with the classical
Arrow-Borch-Raviv framework. Both the DM and the insurer have preferences over the elements of
B` pΣq that have a Subjective Expected-Utility (SEU) representation. The DM’s preferences induce a
utility function u : RÑ R, unique up to a positive linear transformation, and the insurer’s preferences
induce a utility function v : RÑ R, also unique up to a positive linear transformation. Both the DM’s
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and the insurer’s preferences are also assumed to satisfy the Arrow-Villegas Monotone Continuity ax-
iom [16] hence yielding a unique countably additive subjective probability measure on the measurable
space pS,Σq, for each. The subjectivity of the beliefs of each of the DM and the insurer is reflected in
the different subjective probability measure that each has over the measurable space pS,Σq. Formally,
the DM’s beliefs are represented by the countably additive probability measure µ on pS,Σq, and the
insurer’s beliefs are represented by the countably additive probability measure ν on pS,Σq.
Additionally, as in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv framework, I suppose that the DM is risk averse, having
a utility index u such that following holds:
Assumption 4.2. The DM’s utility is bounded and satisfies Inada’s [38] conditions. Specifically,
(1) u is bounded;
(2) u p0q “ 0;
(3) u is strictly increasing and strictly concave;
(4) u is continuously differentiable; and,
(5) u1 p0q “ `8 and lim
xÑ`8
u1 pxq “ 0.
Remark 4.3. Assumption 4.2 (1) above on the DM’s utility function is, strictly speaking, redun-
dant. Indeed, the utility function given from the DM’s preferences in Savage’s SEU representation is a
bounded function ([24, Theorem 14.1] or [27, Theorem 10.2]). Moreover, boundedness of utility func-
tions has been widely accepted as a necessary feature for utilities to be able to properly discriminate
between alternative choices [3, 17].
Furthermore, Assumption 4.2 (3) is as in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv model. Finally, assuming that
u is strictly concave and continuously differentiable implies that u1 is both continuous and strictly
decreasing. This then implies that pu1q´1 is continuous and strictly decreasing, by the Inverse Function
Theorem [47, pp. 221-223].
The DM has initial wealth W0 ą Π, and her total state-contigent wealth is the Σ-measurable,
R-valued and bounded function on S defined by
W psq :“W0 ´Π´X psq ` Y psq , @s P S
I will also make the assumption that the random loss X (with closed range r0,M s) has a nonatomic
law induced by the probability measure µ, that the subjective probability measures µ and ν are not
mutually singular8, and that the DM is almost certain that the random loss she will incur is not larger
than her remaining wealth after the premium has been paid. Specifically:
Assumption 4.4. Assume that:
(1) µ ˝X´1 is nonatomic;
(2) X ďW0 ´Π, µ-a.s. In other words, µ
´
ts P S : X psq ąW0 ´Πu
¯
“ 0;
(3) µ and ν are not mutually singular.
8Two finite nonnegative measuresm1 andm2 on the measurable space pS,Σq are said to be mutually singular, denoted
by m1 K m2, if there is some A P Σ such that m1 pSzAq “ m2 pAq “ 0. In other words, m1 K m2 if there is a Σ-partition
tA,Bu of the set S of states of nature such that µ1 is concentrated on A and µ2 is concentrated on B.
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Assumption 4.4 (1) is a technical requirement that is needed for defining the equimeasurable mono-
tone rearrangement, as in Appendix B. It means that the loss is diffused enough, and is a very common
assumption in many situations (e.g. when it is assumed that a probability density function for X ex-
ists). Assumption 4.4 (2) simply states that the DM is well-diversified so that the particular loss
exposure X against which she is seeking an insurance coverage is sufficiently small. Assumption 4.4
(3) means that the insurer and the DM do not have beliefs that are totally incompatible. However,
this does not prevent the agents from assigning different probabilities to events, and they typically do
not assign same likelihoods to the realizations of the uncertainty X. For instance, they might disagree
on zero-probability events.
Finally, I assume that the insurer is risk-neutral. This assumption is common in contracting prob-
lems, principal-agent problems, and especially in the insurance framework, as in Arrow-Borch-Raviv
model. Since the insurer’s utility function v is unique up to a positive linear transformation, one can
then assume, without loss of generality, that v is simply the identity function. The total state-contigent
wealth of the insurer is the Σ-measurable, R-valued and bounded function on S defined by
W ins psq :“ W ins0 `Π´ Y psq ´ ρ Y psq , @s P S
whereW ins
0
is the insurer’s initial wealth and ρ ą 0 is such that ρY is a (proportional) cost associated
with handling the insurance contract Y , as in the model of Arrow [3] (or section III of Raviv [45]).
4.2. The DM’s problem. The DM seeks the indemnity that will maximize her expected utility of
wealth, under her subjective probability measure, subject to a constraint on the premium and to some
constraints on the indemnity function. Specifically, the DM’s problem is the following:
Problem 4.5. For a given loading factor ρ ą 0,
sup
Y PB`pΣq
"ż
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ
*
:#
0 ď Y ď Xş
v
´
W ins0 `Π´ p1` ρqY
¯
dν ě v
`
W ins0
˘
The first constraint is as in the classical Arrow-Raviv model. The second constraint is simply
the insurer’s participation constraint, or individual rationality constraint, where R “ v
`
W ins0
˘
is the
insurer’s reservation utility. Since v was assumed to be the identity function (by risk-neutrality of the
insurer), the insurer’s individual rationality cosntraint can be re-written as the premium constraint
W ins0 `Π´ p1` ρq
ş
Y dν ěW ins0 , that is,
Π ě p1` ρq
ż
Y dν
Hence, one can write the DM’s problem as follows:
Problem 4.6. For a given loading factor ρ ą 0,
sup
Y PB`pΣq
"ż
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ
*
:"
0 ď Y ď X
Π ě p1` ρq
ş
Y dν
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The second constraint in Problem 4.6 is commonplace in insurance problems. Raviv [45], for
instance, assumes that the premium is at least equal to p1` αq
ş
pI ˝Xq dP , where P in Raviv’s [45]
context is the probability measure common to both the DM and the insurer, and α ě 0 is a loading
factor. Also typical in the insurance problem is to impose an additional monotonicity constraint on
the desired optimal indemnity by requiring that it be nondecreasing in the loss. This constraint,
first introduced by Huberman, Mayers and Smith [37], is meant to prevent moral hazard issues that
might result from a downward misrepresentation of the loss by the DM. Here, I do not impose this
monotonicity as a constraint, but rather achieve it as a property of an optimal indemnity.
4.3. An Information-Structure Interpretation. The model of heterogeneous beliefs introduced
here can be interpreted in terms of the usual information structure approach of the differential infor-
mation literature. Specifically, consider a set S of states of the world, equipped with a σ-algebra G
of events. The random loss X is a fixed G-measurable mapping X : S Ñ r0,M s, for some M ă `8.
An information structure, or information model, for the problem of insurance demand is an object
I “ tpS,Gq , pF1, µ0q , pF2, ν0qu, where F1 and F2 are sub-σ-algebras of G, µ0 is the DM’s prior prob-
ability distribution over the space pS,F1q, and ν0 ‰ µ0 is the insurer’s prior probability distribution
over the space pS,F2q. Both parties are assumed to perfectly observe X, so that there is no dif-
ference between them in the received information regarding the realizations of the underlying loss.
Consequently, one can then assume that F1 “ F2 “ Σ, where Σ is the σ-algebra σtXu of subsets
of S generated by the loss X. Both parties are assumed to be Bayesian, and, upon receiving some
information (the same information), they will update their prior beliefs µ0 and ν0 into interim beliefs
µ and ν. Since µ0 and ν0 differ, so will µ and ν. Once these interim beliefs have been determined, the
parties will engage in the economic activity.
5. Vigilance
The novelty of the insurance model presented in Section 4 is precisely the fact that it allows for
heterogeneity of beliefs, which was lacking in the Arrow-Borch-Raviv framework and in the vast
majority of the subsequent insurance literature. Here, the analysis will be restricted to a class of
beliefs ν that are consistent with the belief µ in a specific sense that will be made precise below. This
restriction is nevertheless general enough to encompass, for instance, cases where these heterogeneous
beliefs induce a likelihood ratio that is monotone, as discussed later on.
5.1. Vigilant Beliefs.
Definition 5.1. The probability measure ν is said to be pµ,Xq-vigilant, or the insurer is said to be
vigilant, if for any two possible insurance contracts Y1, Y2 P B
` pΣq such that
(i) Y1 and Y2 have the same distribution under µ, i.e. µ ˝ Y
´1
1
“ µ ˝ Y ´1
2
, and,
(ii) Y2 and X are comonotonic, i.e.
”
Y2 psq ´ Y2 ps
1q
ı”
X psq ´X ps1q
ı
ě 0, for all s, s1 P S,
the following holds: ż
Y2 dν ď
ż
Y1 dν
Clearly, µ is pµ,Xq-vigilant. One possible interpretation of pµ,Xq-vigilance, when one thinks ofş
Y dν as the minimum premium level that the insurer requires in exchange for paying the state-
contingent indemnity Y to the DM, is as follows. Suppose that ν is pµ,Xq-vigilant and let Y1 P B
` pΣq
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be a given possible insurance contract. Suppose that Y2 is another possible insurance contract such
that Y2 is nondecreasing inX and such that the DM believes Y2 to be identically distributed as Y1 under
her subjective probability measure µ (and hence the DM is indifferent between these two functions).
Vigilance of the insurer’s subjective belief means that the insurer will not perceive Y2 to be riskier
than Y1, in that the insurer is willing to accept a lower minimum premium level when promising to
pay the indemnity Y2 than when promising a payment of Y1. In this sense, the insurer is vigilant in his
assessment of the riskiness of Y2 as a function of X. In a sense, the insurer assigns some credibility to
the DM’s subjective assessment of Y2 in reference to both Y1 andX. This implies a certain probabilistic
consistency between the DM’s and the insurer’s subjective beliefs for this particular class of risks. As
will be seen later on, this consistency requirement is crucial to rule out moral hazard problems that
might result from a downward misrepresentation of the loss by the DM.
Another interpretation of pµ,Xq-vigilance – that reinforces the above idea of “credibility” – comes
from the nature of the class of insurance contracts over which the parties’ preferences are assumed
to be given. These contracts have been defined as functions Y : S Ñ R` of the form Y “ I pXq.
Contracts are then (measurable) functions of the loss X, which can itself be written as Id pXq where
Id denotes the identity function (on the range of X). Intuition then suggests that a given insurance
scheme Y “ I pXq inherently possesses two sources of “variability”, or “randomness”:
(i) a randomness that stems directly from the uncertainty inherent in the state space and in the
loss X, and that will be called the baseline randomness; and,
(ii) an idiosyncratic randomness that is associated with the function I itself, and with its variability
with respect to the identity function Id, which is seen as a reference point for idiosyncratic
randomness. If a given function I’s variability is similar to that of the identity function (that
is, I is comonotonic with Id), then less idiosyncratic risk is attributed to I than to another
function J .
Baseline randomness is hence subjective, in the sense that its evaluation is related to the distribution
of X on the state space, which is itself related to the subjective beliefs of each party. Idiosyncratic
randomness, on the other hand, is not belief-specific. It is an objective evaluation of the variability
of a given function I : R` Ñ R` with respect to the identity function. The overall evaluation of a
given insurance contract is then intuitively an aggregation of two levels of randomness: its (subjective)
baseline randomness and its (objective) idiosyncratic randomness.
Now, consider two agents, agent 1 and agent 2, with respective beliefs P1 and P2 over pS,Σq. If,
for a given insurance scheme I pXq, both of the aforementioned measures of randomness are given to
individual 2, then he is able to assess the overall “riskiness” of I pXq by the process of aggregation
that was heuristically described above. However, if only the idiosyncratic randomness is observable or
trusted by agent 2, then vigilance of agent 2’s belief with respect to agent 1’s belief means that fixing
the baseline randomness according to agent 1’s belief, a comparison of the overall riskiness of contracts
from the point of view of agent 2 can be restricted to a comparison of their idiosyncratic randomness
only. In this sense, vigilance of agent 2’s belief with respect to agent 1’s belief is tantamount to a form
of credibility that agent 2 gives to agent 1’s belief.
5.2. Vigilance and the Monotone Likelihood Ratio Condition. Suppose that, in the setting
of Section 4, the laws µ ˝X´1 and ν ˝X´1 are both absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue
measure, with Radon-Nikody´m derivatives f and g, respectively, where fptq is interpreted as the pdf
that the DM assigns to the loss X and gptq is interpreted as the pdf that the insurer assigns to the
loss X. Then fptq and gptq are both continuous functions with support r0,M s. The likelihood ratio is
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the function LR : r0,M s Ñ R` defined by
(5.1) LRptq :“ gptq{fptq
for all t P r0,M s such that fptq ‰ 0.
Consider the following two conditions that one might impose.
Condition 5.2 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio). LR is a nonincreasing function on its domain.
Condition 5.3 (Vigilance). ν is pµ,Xq-vigilant.
The following proposition shows that the vigilance condition is strictly weaker than the monotone
likelihood ratio condition in this particular setting. Its proof is given in Appendix C.
Proposition 5.4. If Condition 5.2 (Monotone Likelihood Ratio) holds then condition 5.3 (Vigilance)
holds. However, the converse is not true.
The Likelihood Ratio is only defined in situations where densities exist. In other words, when
the DM and the insurer assign distributions to the underlying loss random variable, with probability
density functions, then the likelihood ratio can be defined. What Proposition 5.4 asserts is that not
only is vigilance a weaker assumption than the MLR when a likelihood ratio can be defined, but
also, in other situations where densities do not necessarily exist and hence likelihood ratios cannot be
defined, the notion of vigilance might serve as a substitute.
5.3. Vigilance in Marshall’s [41] Setting. In Marshall’s setup the heterogeneity of beliefs is re-
stricted to the following situation. The loss has a pdf f ptq with a mass point of p0DM at 0 for the DM,
and a pdf g ptq with a mass point of p0In at 0 for the insurer, such that p
0
DM ą p
0
In.
Suppose that, in the setting of Section 4 of this paper, the laws µ ˝ X´1 and ν ˝ X´1 are both
absolutely continuous with respect to Lebesgue measure, with Radon-Nikody´m derivatives f and g,
respectively, where fptq is interpreted as the pdf that the DM assigns to the loss X and gptq is
interpreted as the pdf that the insurer assigns to the loss X. Suppose also that the pdf’s f ptq and
g ptq satisfy the setup of Marshall. Then for any Y1, Y2 P B
` pΣq such that:
(1) Y1 and Y2 have the same distribution under µ,
(2) Y1 psq “ Y2 psq “ 0 for each s P ts P S : X psq “ 0u (e.g. Y1 ď X and Y2 ď X),
the following holds:ż
Y2 dν “ Eν rY2s “ Eν rY2|X “ 0s νtX “ 0u ` Eν rY2|X ą 0s νtX ą 0u
“ Eν rY2|X “ 0s p
0
In ` Eν rY2|X ą 0s
`
1´ p0In
˘
“ Eν rY2|X ą 0s
`
1´ p0In
˘
“ Eµ rY2|X ą 0s
`
1´ p0In
˘
(since fand g are identical conditional on X ą 0)
“ Eµ rY1|X ą 0s
`
1´ p0In
˘
(since Y1 and Y2 have the same distribution under µ)
“ Eν rY1|X ą 0s
`
1´ p0In
˘
(since fand g are identical conditional on X ą 0)
“ Eν rY1s “
ż
Y1 dν
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Therefore, in particular, ν is pµ,Xq-vigilant, if the definition of vigilance is restricted to the class
of functions Y P B` pΣq that take the value zero in each state of the world where the loss takes the
value zero. For instance, if 0 ď Y ď X, then this automatically holds. This is not a limitation, since
these are precisely the only elements of B` pΣq that are of interest to the DM, by the very nature
of the DM’s problem (Problem 4.6). One should also note that the MLR condition in this setting is
artificial since the likelihood ratio only takes two distinct values and since any function taking only
two distinct values is monotone.
6. The DM’s Demand for Insurance Contracts
Recall from Section 4 that the DM’s problem is the following:
Problem 6.1. For a given loading factor ρ ą 0,
sup
Y PB`pΣq
"ż
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ
*
:"
0 ď Y ď X
Π ě p1` ρq
ş
Y dν
The difference between Problem 6.1 and the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv problem (Problem 2.1) is
the fact that the probability measures ν and µ differ. When µ “ ν, denoting this common probability
measure by P takes one back to the classical framework. The main complication in the setting
where ν ‰ µ is dealing with this belief heterogeneity. One insight into this comes from Lebesgue’s
decomposition theorem [19, Theorem 4.3.1].
By Lebesgue’s decomposition theorem, there exists a unique pair pνac, νsq of (nonnegative) finite
measures on pS,Σq such that ν “ νac` νs, νac ! µ, and νs K µ. That is, for all B P Σ with µ pBq “ 0,
one has νac pBq “ 0, and there is some A P Σ such that µ pSzAq “ νs pAq “ 0. It then also follows
that νac pSzAq “ 0 and µ pAq “ 1. Note also that for all Z P B
` pΣq,
ş
Z dν “
ş
A
Z dνac `
ş
SzA Z dνs.
Furthermore, by the Radon-Nikody´m theorem [19, Theorem 4.2.2] there exists a µ-a.s. unique Σ-
measurable and µ-integrable function h : S Ñ r0,`8q such that νac pCq “
ş
C
h dµ, for all C P Σ.
6.1. The Main Results. The Lebesgue decomposition of ν with respect to µ suggests a re-writing
of the premium constraint appearing in Problem 6.1 as
Π{ p1` ρq ě
ż
Y dν “
ż
A
Y h dµ `
ż
SzA
Y dν,
and one can then re-write Problem 6.1 as follows: For a given loading factor ρ ą 0,
sup
Y PB`pΣq
#ż
A
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ`
ż
SzA
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ
+
:"
0 ď Y 1A ` Y 1SzA ď X1A `X1SzA
Π{ p1` ρq ě
ş
A
Y h dµ `
ş
SzA Y dν
This then suggests a splitting of Problem 6.1 into two problems. Each one of these problems is
then solved separately, and the individuals solutions hence obtained are then combined appropriately
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so as to obtain a solution for Problem 6.1. All details are provided in Appendix D, but heuristically,
consider the problems:
sup
Y PB`pΣq
"ż
A
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ : Y 1A ď X1A,
ż
A
Y h dµ “ β
*
for an appropriately chosen β, and
sup
Y PB`pΣq
#ż
SzA
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ : Y 1SzA ď X1SzA,
ż
SzA
Y dν ď α
+
for an appropriately chosen α. Since µ pSzAq “ 0, any feasible Y for the second problem is also
optimal for that problem. Since µ pAq “ 1, the first problem can be written as
sup
Y PB`pΣq
"ż
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ : Y 1A ď X1A,
ż
Y h dµ “ β
*
The main part of solving Problem 6.1 becomes that of solving the latter problem above. This
is a considerably simpler problem than Problem 6.1, since dealing with the heterogeneity of beliefs
appearing in Problem 6.1 has been reduced to dealing simply with the function h. The following
theorem characterizes an optimal solution of Problem 6.1. Its proof is given in Appendix D.
Theorem 6.2. Suppose that the previous assumptions hold, and for each λ ě 0 define the function
Y ˚λ P B
` pΣq by:
(6.1) Y ˚λ :“ min
«
X,max
´
0,X ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
pλhq
ı¯ ﬀ
If the insurer’s subjective probability measure ν is pµ,Xq-vigilant, then there exists a λ˚ ě 0 and an
optimal solution Y˚ to Problem 6.1 which is nondecreasing in the loss X, and such that Y˚ has the
same distribution as Y ˚λ˚ under µ.
Moreover, any other Z˚ which is nondecreasing in X and which has the same distribution as Y ˚λ˚
under µ is such that Z˚ “ Y˚, µ-a.s.
Theorem 6.2 characterizes a class of solutions to Problem 6.1 in terms of their distribution for the
DM, that is for the probability measure µ. Of course, when µ “ ν, so that there is perfect homogeneity
of beliefs as in the classical model, then h “ 1, and so
Y ˚λ “ min
«
X,max
´
0,X ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
pλq
ı¯ﬀ
“ min
«
X, pX ´ dλq
`
ﬀ
,
where dλ :“ W0 ´ Π ´ pu
1q´1 pλq. Since Y ˚λ is then a nondecreasing function of X, Theorem 6.2
simply says that there is some λ˚ such that an optimal contract Y˚ for the DM is such that Y˚ “
min
”
X, pX ´ dλ˚q
`
ı
, µ-a.s., which is a result similar to the classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv theorem
(Theorem 2.2 on p. 6).
Corollary 6.3 below goes a step further than Theorem 6.2 and characterizes the shape of an optimal
insurance contract for the DM. It turns out that such an optimal contract takes the form of what I
will refer to as a generalized deductible contract. Formally, an indemnity schedule I : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s
will be called a generalized deductible insurance contract when there is some d P r0,M s such that
I ptq “
"
0 if t P r0, dq
f ptq if t P rd,M s
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for some nondecreasing Borel-measurable function f : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s such that 0 ď f ptq ď t for
t P r0,M s. Figure 2 below illustrates the shape of an example of a generalized deductible insurance
contract.
✲
x
✻I pxq
d
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
  
Figure 2. An example of a generalized deductible insurance contract.
Corollary 6.3. Under the previous assumptions, and provided the insurer’s subjective probability
measure ν is pµ,Xq-vigilant, there exists an optimal solution Y˚ to Problem 6.1 which is nondecreasing
in the loss X, and such that for µ-a.a. s P S,
Y˚ psq “
"
0 if X psq P r0, a˚q
f pX psqq if X psq P ra˚,M s
(6.2)
for an a˚ ě 0 and a nondecreasing, left-continuous, and Borel-measurable function f : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s
such that 0 ď f ptq ď t for each t P ra˚,M s.
Sufficient conditions for a˚ appearing in eq. (6.2) to be strictly positive are somewhat technical,
and they are relegated to Appendix F.
The proof of Corollary 6.3 is given in Appendix E. Corollary 6.3 essentially says that when vigilance
holds, there is a measurable set D to which the DM assigns full (subjective) probability, and such
that an optimal indemnity schedule I˚ will pay the DM, in the state of the world s P D, the amount
Iop psq, where Iop is a generalized deductible contract on D. Two immediate implications of Corollary
6.3 are:
(1) The existence of the deductible a˚. This is interesting mainly because of the resemblance with
the classical result of Arrow [3], Borch [14], and Raviv [45] (see Theorem 2.2 on p. 6).
(2) The nonlinearity of the insurance contract above the deductible a˚. I do not provide an explicit
characterization of the function f that appears in Corollary 6.3, although it is possible to do
so (see Remark E.14 on p. 39).
7. Conclusion and Open Questions
The subjectivity of beliefs in problems of demand for insurance contracts was largely overlooked.
The classical Arrow-Borch-Raviv approach to insurance demand has traditionally assumed that the
BELIEF HETEROGENEITY IN THE ARROW-BORCH-RAVIV INSURANCE MODEL 19
insurer and the insured – or decision maker (DM) – share the same probabilistic beliefs about the
realization of a given insurable loss. While, intuitively, instances of divergence of beliefs in problems of
insurance are the more realistic, Aumann’s [4] Agreement Theorem and the von Neumann-Morgenstern
approach to uncertainty might give a justification for an assumption of belief homogeneity. I proposed
an argument for the introduction of belief heterogeneity into the Arrow-Borch-Raviv framework based
on a critique of the Common Priors Assumption (CPA) and the Harsa´nyi Doctrine, a criticism of the
assumption of common knowledge of posterior beliefs, the Wislon Doctrine, and the idea of subjective
uncertainty and personal probability.
I then considered an insurance model in the spirit of the Arrow-Borch-Raviv model, with the
exception that both parties have different beliefs about the realizations of the underlying insurable
loss. I showed that under a specific probabilistic consistency assumption on the subjective probability
measure of the insurer with respect to that of the DM that I called vigilance, an optimal insurance
contract for the DM takes a generalized deductible form on an event to which the DM assigns full
subjective probability. I also characterized the class of monotone optimal contracts for the DM in
terms of their distribution for the DM.
The assumption of vigilance is always satisfied in the case of perfect homogeneity of beliefs. In
cases of belief heterogeneity, vigilance can be intuitively interpreted in terms of the credibility that
the insurer gives to the decision maker’s subjective assessment of the risk inherent in the insurance
contract, and of the variability of the contract as a function of the underlying loss. Heuristically, two
sources of randomness were identified that contribute to the overall assessment of the randomness in
every insurance scheme: a baseline randomness that stems from the randomness inherent in the state
space; and, an idiosyncratic randomness that results from the variability of the insurance contract as
a function of the underlying loss, where it is understood that the more the variability of an insurance
scheme is similar to that of the insurable loss, the less idiosyncratic risk is attributed to it. The former
kind of randomness is belief-dependent, and depends on the specific probability measure that one has
over the state space. The latter is belief-independent, and is hence an objective source of randomness
associated with a given contract. Vigilance of the insurer’s subjective probability with respect to the
DM’s subjective probability was then interpreted as requiring that, on the collection of all insurance
schemes that are identically distributed for the DM – and hence between which the DM is indifferent,
a comparison of the overall riskiness of two contracts from the point of view of the insurer can be
restricted to a comparison of their idiosyncratic randomness only.
The assumption of vigilance was then shown to be strictly weaker than the monotone likelihood
ratio assumption, which is commonly used in economics, whenever such a likelihood ratio can be
defined – that is, whenever densities exist. Technically, this assumption of vigilance is essential to
show existence of optimal indemnities which are comonotonic with the random loss X, and hence to
avoid problems of ex-post moral hazard arising from a downward misrepresentation of losses by the
DM.
Three problems of direct relevance to the insurance problem studied here are left for future research.
First, in this paper I did not examine how the shape of an optimal contract changes with the “distance”
between the subjective beliefs of the DM and the insurer, for an appropriately defined notion of
“distance”. It is interesting to examine how, for instance, the deductible a˚ given in eq. (6.2) varies
with the “distance” between µ and ν, for a given fixed generalized deductible contract of the form
given in eq. (6.2). Intuition suggests that a˚ would tend to the Arrow-Borch-Raviv deductible d (given
in Theorem 2.2) when ν “approaches” µ (letting P denote this common probability at the limit).
Another interesting problem to examine is a characterization of the notion of “more pµ,Xq-vigilant
than”, which is an issue that might arise when a DM is faced with the choice between two or more
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potential insurers that she could contract with. Also, a related issue that arises in the presence of
multiple potential insurers is a DM’s “ranking” of these insurers according to some natural criterion.
One such natural criterion would be defining a preference relation over a collection of vigilant insurers,
and seeking a representation of this preference that might be helpful.
Finally, the tools developed by Ghossoub [25, 26] might suggest an extension of this paper’s setting
to situations of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty. These are situations of decision under uncertainty
where the information available to a person is too coarse for that person to be able to formulate an
additive probability measure over the list of contingencies. Rather, the person’s beliefs are represented
by either a collection of possible probability measures [12, 28, 30] or a non-additive probability measure
[50]. I refer to Gilboa and Marinacci [29] for a review of models of decision under ambiguity.
Appendix A. Two Useful Results
Lemma A.1. Let pΩ,Fq be a given measurable space, and suppose that η is a finite non-negative
measure on pΩ,Fq. Let Z be any R`-valued, bounded, and F-measurable function on Ω. If A P F is
such that η pAq ą 0, then the following are equivalent:
(1)
ş
A
Z dη “ 0
(2) Z “ 0, η-a.s. on A.
Proof. [1, Theorem 11.16–(3)]. 
Lemma A.2. Let pS,Σ, µq be a finite nonnegative measure space. If tAnun Ă Σ is such that µ pAnq “
µ pSq, for each n ě 1, then µ
`Ş`8
n“1An
˘
“ µ pSq.
Proof. Since for each n ě 1 one has µ pAnq “ µ pSq, it follows that µ pSzAnq “ 0, for each n ě
1. Therefore, since µ is nonnegative, and by countable subadditivity of countably additive mea-
sures [19, Proposition 1.2.2], it follows that 0 ď µ
`Ť`8
n“1 SzAn
˘
ď
ř`8
n“1 µ pSzAnq “ 0. Therefore,
µ
`Ş`8
n“1An
˘
“ µ pSq ´ µ
`Ť`8
n“1 SzAn
˘
“ µ pSq. 
Appendix B. Equimeasurable Rearrangements and Supermodularity
The classical theory of monotone equimeasurable rearrangements of Borel-measurable functions on
R dates back to the work of Hardy, Littlewood, and Po´lya [33]. The theory was extended in several
direction, and and integral inequalities involving functions and their rearrangements were first given
in [33] and then generalized. Here, the idea of an equimeasurable rearrangement of any element Y
of B` pΣq with respect to the fixed underlying uncertainty X is discussed. All of the results in this
Appendix are taken from Ghossoub [25, 26] to which we refer the reader for proofs, additional results,
and additional references on this topic. Ghossoub [25] extends these ideas to the case of non-additive
probability measures, also known as capacities.
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B.1. The Nondecreasing Rearrangement. Let pS,G, P q be a probability space, and let X P
B` pGq be a continuous random variable (i.e. P ˝ X´1 is nonatomic) with range r0,M s :“ X pSq,
where M :“ suptX psq : s P Su ă `8, i.e. X is a mapping of S onto the closed interval r0,M s.
Denote by Σ the σ-algebra σtXu, and denote by φ the law of X defined by
φ pBq :“ P
´
ts P S : X psq P Bu
¯
“ P ˝X´1 pBq
for any Borel subset B of R.
Proposition B.1. For any Borel-measurable map I : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s there exists a φ-a.s. unique
Borel-measurable map rI : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s such that:
(1) rI is left-continuous and nondecreasing;
(2) rI is φ-equimeasurable with I, in the sense that for any Borel set B,
φ
´
tt P r0,M s : I ptq P B
¯
“ φ
´
tt P r0,M s : rI ptq P Bu¯
(3) If I1, I2 : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s are such that I1 ď I2, φ-a.s., then rI1 ď rI2; and,
(4) If Id : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s denotes the identity function, then ĂId ď Id.
rI will be called the nondecreasing φ-rearrangement of I. Now, define Y :“ I ˝X and rY :“ rI ˝X.
Since both I and rI are Borel-measurable mappings of r0,M s into itself, it follows that Y, rY P B` pΣq.
Note also that rY is nondecreasing in X, in the sense that if s1, s2 P S are such that X ps1q ď
X ps2q then rY ps1q ď rY ps2q, and that Y and rY are P -equimeasurable, that is, for any α P r0,M s,
P pts P S : Y psq ď αuq “ P
´
ts P S : rY psq ď αu¯. The function rY will be called a nondecreasing
P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X, and it will be denoted by rYP to avoid confusion in case
a different measure on pS,Gq is also considered. Note that rYP is P -a.s. unique. Note also that if Y1 and
Y2 are P -equimeasurable and if Y1 P L1 pS,G, P q, then Y2 P L1 pS,G, P q and
ş
ψ pY1q dP “
ş
ψ pY2q dP ,
for any measurable function ψ such that the integrals exist.
Similarly to the previous construction, for a given a Borel-measurable B Ď r0,M s with φ pBq ą 0,
there exists a φ-a.s. unique (on B) nondecreasing, Borel-measurable mapping rIB : B Ñ r0,M s which
is φ-equimeasurable with I on B, in the sense that for any α P r0,M s,
φ
´
tt P B : I ptq ď αu
¯
“ φ
´
tt P B : rIB ptq ď αu¯
rIB is called the nondecreasing φ-rearrangement of I on B. Since X is G-measurable, there ex-
ists A P G such that A “ X´1 pBq, and hence P pAq ą 0. Now, define rYA :“ rIB ˝ X. Since
both I and rIB are bounded Borel-measurable mappings, it follows that Y, rYA P B` pΣq. Note also
that rYA is nondecreasing in X on A, in the sense that if s1, s2 P A are such that X ps1q ď X ps2q
then rY ps1q ď rY ps2q, and that Y and rYA are P -equimeasurable on A, that is, for any α P r0,M s,
P pts P S : Y psq ď αu XAq “ P
´
ts P S : rYA psq ď αu XA¯. The function rYA will be called a non-
decreasing P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X on A, and it will be denoted by rYA,P
to avoid confusion in case a different measure on pS,Gq is also considered. Note that rYA,P is P -a.s.
unique. Note also that if Y1,A and Y2,A are P -equimeasurable on A and if
ş
A
Y1,A dP ă `8, then
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ş
A
Y2,A dP ă `8 and
ş
A
ψ pY1,Aq dP “
ş
A
ψ pY2,Aq dP , for any measurable function ψ such that the
integrals exist.
Lemma B.2. Let Y P B` pΣq and let A P G be such that P pAq “ 1 and X pAq is a Borel set9. LetrYP be the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X, and let rYA,P be the nondecreasing
P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X on A. Then rYP “ rYA,P , P -a.s.
B.2. Supermodularity and Hardy-Littlewood-Po´lya Inequalities. A partially ordered set (poset)
is a pair pT,ěq where ě is a reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric binary relation on T . For any
x, y P S denote by x _ y (resp. x ^ y) the least upper bound (resp. greatest lower bound) of the set
tx, yu. A poset pT,ěq is called a lattice when x_ y, x^ y P T , for each x, y P T .
For instance, the Euclidian space Rn is a lattice for the partial order ě defined as follows: for x “
px1, . . . , xnq P R
n and y “ py1, . . . , ynq P R
n, write x ě y when xi ě yi, for each i “ 1, . . . , n. It is then
easy to see that x_ y “ pmax px1, y1q , . . . ,max pxn, ynqq and x^ y “ pmin px1, y1q , . . . ,min pxn, ynqq.
Definition B.3. Let pT,ěq be a lattice. A function L : T Ñ R is said to be supermodular if for each
x, y P T ,
(B.1) L px_ yq ` L px^ yq ě L pxq ` L pyq
In particular, a function L : R2 Ñ R is supermodular if for any x1, x2, y1, y2 P R with x1 ď x2 and
y1 ď y2, one has
(B.2) L px2, y2q ` L px1, y1q ě L px1, y2q ` L px2, y1q
Equation (B.2) then implies that a function L : R2 Ñ R is supermodular if and only if the function
η pyq :“ L px` h, yq ´ L px, yq is nondecreasing on R, for any x P R and h ě 0.
Example B.4. The following are supermodular functions:
(1) If g : R Ñ R is concave, and a P R, then the function L1 : R
2 Ñ R defined by L1 px, yq “
g pa´ x` yq is supermodular.
(2) If ψ, φ : R Ñ R are both nonincreasing or both nondecreasing functions, then the function
L4 : R
2 Ñ R defined by L4 px, yq “ φ pxq ψ pyq is supermodular.
Lemma B.5 (Hardy-Littlewood-Po´lya Inequalities). Let Y P B` pΣq and let A P G be such that
P pAq ą 0 and X pAq is a Borel set. Let rYP be the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y with respect
to X, and let rYA,P be the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X on A. If L is
supermodular then:
(1)
ş
L
´
X,Y
¯
dP ď
ş
L
´
X, rYP¯ dP ; and,
(2)
ş
A
L
´
X,Y
¯
dP ď
ş
A
L
´
X, rYA,P¯ dP ,
9Note that if A P Σ “ σtXu then X pAq is automatically a Borel set, by definition of σtXu. Indeed, for any A P σtXu,
there is some Borel set B such that A “ X´1 pBq. Then X pAq “ B XX pSq [22, p. 7]. Thus X pAq “ B X r0,Ms is a
Borel subset of r0,Ms.
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provided the integrals exist.
Lemma B.6. Let Y P B` pΣq and let A P G be such that P pAq ą 0 and X pAq is a Borel set. LetrYP be the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X, and let rYA,P be the nondecreasing
P -rearrangement of Y with respect to X on A. Then the following hold:
(1) If 0 ď Y ď X, P -a.s., then 0 ď rYP ď X; and,
(2) If 0 ď Y ď X, P -a.s. on A, then 0 ď rYA,P ď X, P -a.s. on A.
B.3. Approximation of the Rearrangement.
Lemma B.7. If f and fn are r0,`8q-valued, Σ-measurable functions on S such that the sequence
tfnun converges pointwise P -a.s. to f monotonically downwards, then the sequence t rfn,P un converges
pointwise P -a.s. to rfP monotonically downwards, where rfP is the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of
f with respect to X, and rfn,P is the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of fn with respect to X, for each
n P N.
Lemma B.8. Let f and fn be r0,`8q-valued, Σ-measurable functions on S. If fn P B
` pΣq, for each
n ě 1, and if the sequence tfnun converges uniformly to f P B
` pΣq, then
(1) The functions rfP and rfn,P are in L8, for each n ě 1, where rfP is the nondecreasing P -
rearrangement of f with respect to X, and rfn,P is the nondecreasing P -rearrangement of fn
with respect to X, for each n P N; and,
(2) The sequence t rfn,P un converges to rfP in the L8 norm.
Appendix C. Proof of Proposition 5.4
First, note that Condition 5.2 implies that the map L : r0,M s ˆ r0,M s Ñ R defined by
L px, yq :“ ´yLR pxq
is supermodular (see Example B.4 (2)).
Suppose that Condition 5.2 holds. To show that Condition 5.3 is implied, choose any Y1, Y2 P B
` pΣq
such that Y1 and Y2 have the same distribution under µ, and Y2 is comonotonic with X. Then by
the µ-a.s. uniqueness of the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement, Y2 is µ-a.s. equal to rY1,µ, where rY1 is
the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y1 with respect to X. Furthermore, the function L px, yq “
´yLR pxq is supermodular, as observed above. Consequently, by Lemma B.5, it follows thatż
L
´
X, rY1,µ¯ dµ ě ż L´X,Y1¯ dµ
that is, ż rY1,µ Z dµ ď ż Y1 Z dµ
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where Z is as defined above. Since Y2 “ rY1,µ, µ-a.s., we then haveż
Y2 Z dµ ď
ż
Y1 Z dµ
which yields10 the following: ż
Y2 dν ď
ż
Y1 dν
as required. Condition 5.3 hence follows from Condition 5.2.
The following example gives a situation where both the DM and the insurer assign a different pdf
to the insurable loss and where the MLR condition fails but the Vigilance condition holds, hence
showing that Condition 5.3 cannot imply Condition 5.2, i.e. Vigilance is strictly weaker than the MLR
condition.
Example C.1. Suppose that f ptq “ 1{M , that is, f is the pdf of a continuous uniformly distributed
random variable on the interval r0,M s. Let Y1 “ X P B
` pΣq, and let Y2 “ I ˝X P B
` pΣq be such
that Y1 and Y2 are identically distributed under µ, and Y2 is comonotonic with X. Then by the µ-a.s.
uniqueness of the nondecreasing rearrangement, Y2 “ rY1,µ, µ-a.s., that is, I “ĂId, µ ˝X´1-a.s., where
Id denotes the identity function.
Fix x‹ P p0,Mq such that11 I px‹q “ ĂId px‹q, and let g ptq “ δ pt´ x˚q, the Dirac delta function12
centered at x˚. The likelihood ratio LR “ g{f is defined on the whole of r0,M s and is clearly not
nonincreasing. Therefore, the MLR condition fails. However, to see that the Vigilance condition still
holds, note that ż
Y2 dν “
ż
I ˝X dν “
ż
XpSq
I dν ˝X´1 “
ż M
0
I ptq g ptq dt
“
ż M
0
I ptq δ pt´ x˚q dt “ I px˚q “ ĂId px‹q
Similarly,
ş
Y1 dν “ Id px
‹q “ x‹. Hence, by Proposition B.1 (4),ż
Y2 dν “ ĂId px‹q ď Id px‹q “ ż Y1 dν
and hence ν is pµ,Xq-vigilant. This completes the proof of Proposition 5.4. l
Appendix D. Proof of Theorem 6.2
As in Section 6.1, there exists a unique pair pνac, νsq of (nonnegative) finite measures on pS,Σq such
that ν “ νac ` νs, νac ! µ, and νs K µ. That is, for all B P Σ with µ pBq “ 0, one has νac pBq “ 0,
and there is some A P Σ such that µ pSzAq “ νs pAq “ 0. It then also follows that νac pSzAq “ 0 and
10By two “changes of variable”, as in [1, Theorem 13.46], and using the definition of f and g as Radon-Nikody´m
derivatives of µ ˝X´1 and ν ˝X´1, respectively, with respect to the Lebesgue measure.
11This choice of x‹ is possible for if it were not, than that would contradict the fact that Y1 and Y2 are identically
distributed for µ.
12For any a P R, the Dirac delta function centered at a is zero everywhere except at a where it is infinite. Moreover,şa`ε
a´ε
φ ptq δ pt´ aq dt “ φ paq, for any ε ą 0 and for any function φ. See, e.g. [15, Chap. 5].
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µ pAq “ 1. In the following, the Σ-measurable set A on which µ is concentrated and νs pAq “ 0 is
assumed to be fixed all throughout.
D.1. “Splitting” the Initial Problem.
Lemma D.1. Let Y ˚ be an optimal solution for Problem 6.1, and suppose that ν is pµ,Xq-vigilant.
Let rY ˚µ be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚ with respect to X. Then:
(1) rY ˚µ is optimal for Problem 6.1; and,
(2) rY ˚µ “ rY ˚µ,A, µ-a.s., where rY ˚µ,A is the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚ with respect to X
on A. In particular, Y ˚ and rY ˚µ,A have the same distribution under µ.
Proof. Since the function U : R2 Ñ R defined by U px, yq :“ u pW0 ´Π´ x` yq is supermodular (see
Example B.4 (1)), it follows from Lemma B.5 thatż
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` rY ˚µ ¯ dµ ě ż u´W0 ´Π´X ` Y ˚¯ dµ
Moreover, since 0 ď Y ˚ ď X, it follows from Lemma B.6 that 0 ď rY ˚µ ď X. Finally, since ν is
pµ,Xq-vigilant, it follows that
Π{ p1` ρq ě
ż
Y ˚ dν ě
ż
Y ˚µ dν
and so rY ˚µ is optimal for Problem 6.1.
Now, let rY ˚µ,A be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚ with respect to X on A. Since µ pAq “ 1,
then by Lemma B.2 one has that rY ˚µ “ rY ˚µ,A, µ-a.s. Therefore, rY ˚µ and rY ˚µ,A have the same distribution
under µ. Hence, form the equimeasurability of Y ˚ and rY ˚µ , it follows that Y ˚ and rY ˚µ,A have the same
distribution under µ. 
Lemma D.2. Let an optimal solution for Problem 6.1 be given by:
(D.1) Y ˚ “ Y ˚1 1A ` Y
˚
2 1SzA
for some Y ˚1 , Y
˚
2 P B
` pΣq. Let rY ˚µ be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚ with respect to X,
and let Y ˚1,µ be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y
˚
1 with respect to X. Then
rY ˚µ “ rY ˚1,µ, µ-a.s.,
and hence Y ˚ and rY ˚
1,µ have the same distribution under µ.
Proof. Let rY ˚µ,A be the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚ with respect to X on A. Since µ pAq “
1, then by Lemma B.2 one has rY ˚µ “ rY ˚µ,A, µ-a.s. Similarly, let rY ˚1,µ,A be the nondecreasing µ-
rearrangement of Y ˚1 with respect to X on A. Then
rY ˚1,µ “ rY ˚1,µ,A, µ-a.s. Therefore, it suffices to
show that rY ˚µ,A “ rY ˚1,µ,A, µ-a.s. Since both rY ˚µ,A and rY ˚1,µ,A are nondecreasing functions of X on A,
then by the µ-a.s. uniqueness of the nondecreasing rearrangement, it remains to show that they are
µ-equimeasurable with Y ˚ on A. Now, for each t P r0,M s,
µ
´
ts P A : rY ˚µ,A psq ď tu¯ “ µ´ts P A : Y ˚ psq ď tu¯ “ µ´ts P A : Y ˚1 psq ď tu¯
“ µ
´
ts P A : rY ˚1,µ,A psq ď tu¯
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where the first equality follows from the definition of rY ˚µ,A (equimeasurabiltiy), the second equality
follows from equation (D.1), and the third equality follows from the definition of rY ˚
1,µ,A (equimea-
surabiltiy). Therefore, rY ˚µ “ rY ˚1,µ, µ-a.s., and hence rY ˚µ and rY ˚1,µ have the same distribution under
µ. Consequently, by equimeasurability of Y ˚ and rY ˚µ , it follows that Y ˚ and rY ˚1,µ have the same
distribution under µ. 
What Lemma D.1 asserts is that when the insurer’s subjective probability measure is vigilant with
respect to the DM’s subjective probability measure in regards to the risk X, and if there exists an
indemnity schedule which is perceived by the DM as optimal for her initial problem, then there exists
another indemnity schedule which is perceived by the DM as optimal for her initial problem, and which
rules out any possibility of moral hazard resulting from a voluntary downward misrepresentation of
losses by the DM. Indeed, as long as an indemnity schedule is nondecreasing in the insurable loss,
there is no incentive for the DM to misrepresent the loss downwards. Consider now the following three
problems:
Problem D.3. For a given β P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
,
sup
Y PB`pΣq
"ż
A
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ
*
:"
0 ď Y 1A ď X1Aş
A
Y dν “ β
Problem D.4.
sup
Y PB`pΣq
#ż
SzA
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ
+
:#
0 ď Y 1SzA ď X1SzAş
SzA Y dν ď min
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β,
ş
SzAX dν
¯
, for the same β as in Problem D.3
Problem D.5.
sup
β
«
F ˚A pβq ` F
˚
A
ˆ
Π
1` ρ
´ β
˙
: 0 ď β ď min
ˆ
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ż
A
X dν
˙ﬀ
:#
F ˚A pβq is the supremum value of Problem D.3, for a fixed β
F ˚A
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β
¯
is the supremum value of Problem D.4, for the same fixed β
Remark D.6. The feasibility sets of Problems D.3 and D.4 are nonempty. To see why this is true,
first note that:
(1) Since µ and ν are not mutually singular, by Assumption 4.4, and since µ pSzAq “ 0, it follows
that ν pAq ą 0;
(2) Since ν pAq ą 0, h ě 0, and ν pAq “ νac pAq ` νs pAq “ νac pAq “
ş
A
h dµ, it follows from
Lemma A.1 that there exists some B P Σ such that B Ď A, µ pBq ą 0, and h ą 0 on B.
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If
ş
A
X dν “
ş
A
Xh dµ “ 0, then by Lemma A.1 one has Xh “ 0, µ-a.s. on A. However, h ą 0 on
B. Thus, X “ 0, µ-a.s. on B. Consequently, there is some C P Σ, with C Ď B and µ pCq ą 0, such
that X “ 0 on C and µ pBzCq “ 0. Therefore, µ pBq “ µ pCq. Now, since X psq “ 0, for each s P C,
it follows that C Ď ts P S : X psq “ 0u. Thus, by monotonicity of µ, µ pCq ď µ pts P S : X psq “ 0uq “
µ ˝ X´1 pt0uq. But µ ˝ X´1 pt0uq “ 0, by nonatomicity of µ ˝ X´1 (Assumption 4.4). Therefore,
µ pCq “ 0, a contradiction. Hence
ş
A
X dν ą 0.
Now, for a given β P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
, the function Y1 :“
βXş
A
X dν
is feasible for Problem
D.3 with parameter β.
If
ş
SzAX dν “ 0, then Y2 :“ 0 is feasible for Problem D.4. If
ş
SzAX dν ą 0, then Y3 :“
αXş
SzA
X dν
,
with α :“ min
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β,
ş
SzAX dν
¯M
2, is feasible for Problem D.4 with parameter β, for any given
β P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
.
Note also that by boundedness of the utility function u (Assumption 4.2), the supremum value of
each of the above three problems is finite.
Lemma D.7. If β˚ is optimal for Problem D.5, Y ˚
3
is optimal for Problem D.3 with parameter β˚,
and Y ˚
4
is optimal for Problem D.4 with parameter β˚, then Y ˚
2
:“ Y ˚
3
1A ` Y
˚
4
1SzA is optimal for
Problem 6.1.
Proof. Feasibility of Y ˚
2
for Problem 6.1 is immediate. To show optimality of Y ˚
2
for Problem 6.1, letrY be any other feasible solution for Problem 6.1, and define α :“ ş
A
rY dν. Then α “ ş
A
rY h dµ andş
A
X dν “
ş
A
Xh dµ, since νs pAq “ 0. Moreover, α P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
since rY is feasible
for Problem 6.1. Consequently, α is feasible for Problem D.5. Furthermore, rY 1A (resp. rY 1SzA) is
feasible for Problem D.3 (resp. Problem D.4) with parameter α, and hence$&% F
˚
A pαq ě
ş
A
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` rY ¯ dµ
F ˚A
´
Π
1`ρ ´ α
¯
ě
ş
SzA u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` rY ¯ dµ
Now, since β˚ is optimal for Problem D.5, it follows that
F ˚A pβ
˚q ` F ˚A
ˆ
Π
1` ρ
´ β˚
˙
ě F ˚A pαq ` F
˚
A
ˆ
Π
1` ρ
´ α
˙
However, #
F ˚A pβ
˚q “
ş
A
u pW0 ´Π´X ` Y
˚
3
q dµ
F ˚A
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β
˚
¯
“
ş
SzA u pW0 ´Π´X ` Y
˚
4
q dµ
Therefore, ż
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
˚
2
¯
dµ ě
ż
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` rY ¯ dµ
Hence, Y ˚
2
is optimal for Problem 6.1. 
Remark D.8. By Lemmata D.1, D.2, and D.7, if ν is pµ,Xq-vigilant, β˚ is optimal for Problem D.5,
Y ˚1 is optimal for Problem D.3 with parameter β
˚, and Y ˚2 is optimal for Problem D.4 with parameter
β˚, then rY ˚µ is optimal for Problem 6.1, and rY ˚µ “ rY ˚1,µ, µ-a.s., where rY ˚µ (resp. rY ˚1,µ) is the µ-a.s.
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unique nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚ :“ Y ˚1 1A ` Y
˚
2 1SzA (resp. of Y
˚
1 ) with respect to X. In
particular, Y ˚ and rY ˚1,µ have the same distribution under µ.
Lemma D.9. If β˚ is optimal for Problem D.5, then β˚ ą 0.
Proof. First note the following:
(i) Since µ pSzAq “ 0, it follows that
ş
SzA Z dµ “ 0, for each Z P B pΣq, and so F
˚
A
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β
¯
“ 0,
for each β P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
. Consequently, F ˚A pβq`F
˚
A
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β
¯
“ F ˚A pβq, for
each β P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
. Therefore, in particular, F ˚A pβ
˚q ` F ˚A
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β
˚
¯
“
F ˚A pβ
˚q.
(ii) Since µ and ν are not mutually singular, by Assumption 4.4, it follows that ν pAq ą 0.
(iii) Since ν pAq ą 0, h ě 0, and ν pAq “ νac pAq ` νs pAq “ νac pAq “
ş
A
h dµ, it follows from
Lemma A.1 that there exists some B P Σ such that B Ď A, µ pBq ą 0, and h ą 0 on B.
Now, suppose, per contra, that β˚ “ 0 is optimal for Problem D.5, and let Y0 be optimal for
Problem D.3 with parameter 0, so that F ˚A p0q “
ş
A
u pW0 ´Π´X ` Y0q dµ. Since β
˚ “ 0 is optimal
for Problem D.5, one has F ˚A p0q ě F
˚
A pβq, for each β P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
. Since Y0 is
feasible for Problem D.3 with parameter β˚ “ 0, one has
ş
A
Y0 dν “
ş
A
Y0h dµ “ β
˚ “ 0. Now,
since µ pAq ą 0 and Y0h ě 0, it follows from Lemma A.1 that Y0h “ 0, µ-a.s. on A. Moreover,
since h ą 0 on B and µ pBq ą 0, it follows that Y0 “ 0, µ-a.s. on B. Define the function Z by
Z :“ Y01AzB `min
´
X,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
1B , and let KZ :“
ş
A
Z dν. Then the following clearly hold:
(i) Z P B` pΣq;
(ii) 0 ď Z1A ď X1A;
(iii) 0 ď KZ ď min
´ ş
A
X dν,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
.
Therefore, in particular, KZ is feasible for Problem D.5 and Z is feasible for Problem D.3 with
parameter KZ . Moreover,
0 ď KZ “
ż
AzB
Y0 dν `
ż
B
min
´
X,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
dν
“
ż
B
min
´
X,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
dν “
ż
B
min
´
X,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
h dµ
If KZ “ 0, then
ş
B
min
´
X,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
h dµ “ 0 and min
´
X,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
h ě 0. Hence, by Lemma
A.1, min
´
X,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
h “ 0, µ-a.s. on B. However, h ą 0 on B. Thus, min
´
X,Π{ p1` ρq
¯
“ 0, µ-
a.s. on B. Since Π ą 0, this yields X “ 0, µ-a.s. on B. Consequently, there is some C P Σ, with
C Ď B and µ pCq ą 0, such that X “ 0 on C and µ pBzCq “ 0. Therefore, µ pBq “ µ pCq. Now,
since X psq “ 0, for each s P C, it follows that C Ď ts P S : X psq “ 0u. Thus, by monotonicity of µ,
µ pCq ď µ pts P S : X psq “ 0uq “ µ ˝X´1 pt0uq. But µ ˝X´1 pt0uq “ 0, by nonatomicity of µ ˝X´1
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(Assumption 4.4). Therefore, µ pCq “ 0, a contradiction. Hence KZ ą 0. Finally,
F ˚A pKZq ě
ż
A
u pW0 ´Π´X ` Zq dµ
“
ż
AzB
u pW0 ´Π´X ` Y0q dµ`
ż
B
u pW0 ´Π´X `min pX,Π{ p1` ρqqq dµ
ě
ż
AzB
u pW0 ´Π´X ` Y0q dµ`
ż
B
u pW0 ´Π´Xq dµ
“
ż
A
u pW0 ´Π´X ` Y0q dµ :“ F
˚
A p0q “ F
˚
A pβ
˚q
This contradicts the optimality of β˚ “ 0 for Problem D.5. Consequently, if β˚ is optimal for
Problem D.5 then β˚ ą 0. 
D.2. Solving Problem D.4. Since µ pSzAq “ 0, it follows that, for all Y P B` pΣq, one hasż
SzA
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ “ 0
Consequently, any Y which is feasible for Problem D.4 with paramter β is also optimal for Problem
D.4 with parameter β. For instance, define Y ˚4 :“ min
«
X,max
!
0,X´dβ
)ﬀ
, where dβ is chosen such
that
ş
SzA Y
˚
4 dν ď min
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β,
ş
SzAX dν
¯
. Then Y ˚4 1SzA is optimal for Problem D.4.
Remark D.10. The choice of dβ so that
ş
SzA Y
˚
4
dν ď min
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β,
ş
SzAX dν
¯
is justified by the
following argument: define the function φ : R` Ñ R` by
φ pαq “
ż
SzA
Y4,α dν
where Y4,α :“ min rX,maxt0,X ´ αus, for each α ě 0. Then φ is a nonincreasing function of α.
Moreover, by the continuity of the functions max p0, .q and min px, .q, and by Lebesgue’s Dominated
Convergence Theorem, φ is a continuous function of the parameter α. Now, by the continuity of the
functions max and min, lim
αÑ0
Y4,α “ X and lim
αÑ`8
Y4,α “ 0. Therefore, by continuity of the function
φ in α,
lim
αÑ0
φ pαq “
ż
SzA
X dν and lim
αÑ`8
φ pαq “ 0
Consequently, φ is a continuous nonincreasing function of α such that lim
αÑ`8
φ pαq “ 0 and lim
αÑ0
φ pαq “ş
SzAX dν. Thus, by the Intermediate Value Theorem, one can always choose α such that φ pαq ď
min
´
Π
1`ρ ´ β,
ş
SzAX dν
¯
, for any β P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
.
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D.3. Solving Problem D.3. For a fixed parameter β P
“
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
, Problem D.3
will be solved “statewise”, as described below. Moreover, by Lemma D.9, one can restrict the analysis
to the case where β P
`
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
.
Lemma D.11. If Y ˚ P B` pΣq satisfies the following:
(1) 0 ď Y ˚ psq ď X psq, for all s P A;
(2)
ş
A
Y ˚h dµ “ β, for some β P
`
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
; and,
(3) There exists some λ ě 0 such that for all s P Azts P S : h psq “ 0u,
Y ˚ psq “ argmax
0ďyďXpsq
«
u
´
W0 ´Π´X psq ` y
¯
´ λyh psq
ﬀ
Then the function Z˚ :“ Y ˚1AztsPS:hpsq“0u `X1AXtsPS:hpsq“0u solves Problem D.3 with parameter β.
Proof. Suppose that Y ˚ P B` pΣq satisfies p1q, p2q, and p3q above. Then Z˚ is clearly feasible for
Problem D.3 with parameter β. To show optimality of Z˚ for Problem D.3 note that for any other
Y P B` pΣq which is feasible for Problem D.3 with parameter β, one has, for all s P Azts P S : h psq “
0u,
u
´
W0 ´Π´X psq ` Z
˚ psq
¯
´ u
´
W0 ´Π´X psq ` Y psq
¯
“ u
´
W0 ´Π´X psq ` Y
˚ psq
¯
´ u
´
W0 ´Π´X psq ` Y psq
¯
ě λ
”
h psqY ˚ psq ´ h psqY psq
ı
“ λ
”
h psqZ˚ psq ´ h psqY psq
ı
Furthermore, since u is increasing, since 0 ď Y ď X on A, and since Z˚ psq “ X psq for all s P ts P
S : h psq “ 0u XA, it follows that for all s P ts P S : h psq “ 0u XA,
u
´
W0 ´Π´X psq ` Z
˚ psq
¯
“ u
´
W0 ´Π
¯
ě u
´
W0 ´Π´X psq ` Y psq
¯
Thus, ż
AXtsPS:hpsq“0u
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Z
˚
¯
dµ ´
ż
AXtsPS:hpsq“0u
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ ě 0
Consequently,ż
A
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Z
˚
¯
dµ´
ż
A
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ
ě
ż
AztsPS:hpsq“0u
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Z
˚
¯
dµ´
ż
AztsPS:hpsq“0u
u
´
W0 ´Π´X ` Y
¯
dµ
ě λ
”
β ´ β
ı
“ 0
which completes the proof. 
Lemma D.12. For any λ ě 0, the function given by
(D.2) Y ˚λ :“ min
«
X,max
´
0,X ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
pλhq
ı¯ ﬀ
satisfies conditions p1q and p3q of Lemma D.11.
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Proof. Fix λ ě 0, fix s P Azts P S : h psq “ 0u, and consider the problem
(D.3) max
0ďyďXpsq
f pyq :“
«
u
´
W0 ´Π´X psq ` y
¯
´ λyh psq
ﬀ
Since u is strictly concave (by Assumption 4.2), so is f , as a function of y. In particular, f 1 pyq is
a (strictly) decreasing function. Hence the first-order condition on f yields a global maximum for f
at y˚ :“ X psq ´
”
W0 ´Π´ pu
1q´1 pλh psqq
ı
. If y˚ ă 0, then since f 1 is decreasing, it is negative on
the interval r0,X psqs. Therefore, f is decreasing on the interval r0,X psqs, and hence attains a local
maximum of f p0q at y “ 0. If y˚ ą X psq, then since f 1 is decreasing, it is positive on the interval
r0,X psqs. Therefore, f is increasing on the interval r0,X psqs, and hence attains a local maximum
of f pX psqq at y “ X psq. If 0 ă y˚ ă X psq, then the local maximum of f on the interval r0,X psqs
is its global maximum f py˚q. Consequently, the function y˚˚ :“ min
”
X psq ,max p0, y˚q
ı
solves the
problem appearing in eq. (D.3). Since s and λ were chosen arbitrarily, this completes the proof of
Lemma D.12. 
Lemma D.13. For Y ˚λ defined in equation (D.2), the following holds:
Y ˚λ 1AztsPS:hpsq“0u `X1AXtsPS:hpsq“0u “ Y
˚
λ 1A
Therefore, ż
A
“
Y ˚λ 1AztsPS:hpsq“0u `X1AXtsPS:hpsq“0u
‰
dν “
ż
A
Y ˚λ dν “
ż
A
Y ˚λ h dµ
Proof. Indeed, if s P ts P S : h psq “ 0u, then pu1q´1 pλh psqq “ pu1q´1 p0q “ `8, by Assumption 4.2.
Thus, for each s P ts P S : h psq “ 0u one has
Y ˚λ psq “ min
«
X psq ,max
´
0,X psq ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
p0q
ı¯ ﬀ
“ X psq
The rest then follows trivially. 
Lemma D.14. Define the function φ : R` Ñ R` as follows: for each λ P R`,
φ pλq :“
ż
A
“
Y ˚λ 1AztsPS:hpsq“0u `X1AXtsPS:hpsq“0u
‰
dν
“
ż
A
Y ˚λ dν “
ż
A
Y ˚λ h dµ
Then φ is a continuous nonincreasing function of the parameter λ.
Proof. First, recall that
Y ˚λ :“ min
«
X,max
´
0,X ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
pλhq
ı¯ ﬀ
Continuity of φ is a direct consequence of Lebesgue’s Dominated Convergence Theorem and of the
continuity of each of the functions pu1q´1, max p0, .q, and min px, .q (the function pu1q´1 is continuous
by Remark 4.3). The fact that φ is nonincreasing in λ results from the concavity of u, i.e. from the
fact that u1 is a nonincreasing function. 
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Lemma D.15. Consider the function φ defined above. Then:
(1) lim
λÑ0
φ pλq “
ş
A
X dν; and,
(2) lim
λÑ`8
φ pλq “ 0.
Proof. By continuity of the functions pu1q´1, max p0, .q, and min px, .q, it follows that for each s P S,
lim
λÑ0
Y ˚λ psq “ min
«
X psq ,max
´
0,X psq ´
”
W0 ´Π´ pu
1q´1 p0q
ı¯ﬀ
. Moreover, as was shown above,
min
«
X,max
´
0,X ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
p0q
ı¯ﬀ
“ X
Therefore, lim
λÑ0
Y ˚λ psq “ X psq, for each s P S. Hence, by continuity of the function φ in λ, it follows
that lim
λÑ0
φ pλq “
ş
A
X dν. Similarly, by continuity of the functions pu1q´1, max p0, .q, and min px, .q,
one has that for each s P S,
lim
λÑ`8
Y ˚λ psq “ min
«
X psq ,max
´
0,X psq ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
p`8q
ı¯ﬀ
However, by continuity of the function φ in λ, one has
lim
λÑ`8
φ pλq “
ż
A
lim
λÑ`8
Y ˚λ dν
But by Assumption 4.2, pu1q´1 p`8q “ 0, and by Assumption 4.4, X ď W0 ´ Π, µ-a.s. Moreover,
µ pAq “ 1. Therefore, ż
A
lim
λÑ`8
Y ˚λ dν “
ż
A
lim
λÑ`8
Y ˚λ h dµ “ 0

Remark D.16. Hence, summing up, the function φ defined above is a nonincreasing continuous
function of the parameter λ such that lim
λÑ0
φ pλq “
ş
A
X dν and lim
λÑ`8
φ pλq “ 0. Therefore, φ pλq P“
0,
ş
A
X dν
‰
, and so by the Intermediate Value Theorem, for each β P
`
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
one can chose λ “ λβ P r0,`8q such that
β “ φ
`
λ
˘
“
ż ”
Y ˚
λ
1AztsPS:hpsq“0u `X1AXtsPS:hpsq“0u
ı
h dµ
Therefore, by Lemmata D.11 and D.12, the function Y ˚
λ
defined above solves Problem D.3, with
parameter β. Finally, let β˚ be optimal for Problem D.5, let λ˚ be chosen for β˚ just as λ was
chosen for β in Remark D.16, and let Y ˚λ˚ be a corresponding optimal solution for Problem D.4 with
parameter β˚. The rest then follows from Remark D.8. The µ-a.s. uniqueness part of Theorem 6.2
follows from the uniqueness property of the nondecreasing rearrangement. This concludes the proof
of Theorem 6.2. l
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Appendix E. Proof of Corollary 6.3
Fix β P
`
0,min
`
Π{ p1` ρq ,
ş
A
X dν
˘‰
, and let λ be the corresponding λ, chosen as in to Remark
D.16. Since h is nonnegative, Σ-measurable and µ-integrable, there is a sequence thnun of nonnegative,
µ-simple and µ-integrable functions on pS,Σq that converges monotonically upwards and pointwise
to h [19, Proposition 2.1.7]. Therefore, since u1 is bicontinuous (so that, in particular, pu1q´1 is
continuous), it follows that the sequence tYλ,nun, defined by
Yλ,n :“ X ´W0 `Π`
`
u1
˘´1 `
λhn
˘
,
converges pointwise to Yλ, defined by
Yλ :“ X ´W0 `Π`
`
u1
˘´1 `
λh
˘
Since the sequence thnun converges monotonically upwards and pointwise to h, and since pu
1q´1 is
continuous and decreasing, it follows that the sequence tYλ,nun converges monotonically downwards
and pointwise to Yλ. Now, for each n P N, there is some mn P N, a Σ-partition tBi,nu
mn
i“1 of S, and
some nonnegative real numbers αi,n ě 0, for i “ 1, ...,mn, such that hn “
řmn
i“1 αi,n 1Bi,n . Since
X ´W0 `Π can be written as
řmn
i“1 pX ´W0 `Πq1Bi,n , it is then easy to see that
Yλ,n “
mnÿ
i“1
´`
u1
˘´1 `
λ αi,n
˘
`X ´W0 `Π
¯
1Bi,n
Define Y ˚
λ,n
by
Y ˚
λ,n
:“ min
”
X,max
´
0, Yλ,n
¯ı
By continuity of the functions max p0, .q and min px, .q, and since max p0, tq and min pX psq , tq are
nondecreasing functions of t for each s P S, it follows that the sequence tY ˚
λ,n
un converges monotonically
downwards and pointwise to Y ˚
λ
(given by equation (D.2)).
Remark E.1. For each n ě 1, let rY ˚
λ,n,µ
denote the µ-a.s. unique nondecreasing µ-rearrangement
of Y ˚
λ,n
with respect to X. Then by Lemma B.7, the sequence trYλ,n,µun converges monotonically
downwards and pointwise µ-a.s. to rYλ,µ.
Note that, for each n P N, one can rewrite Y ˚
λ,n
as
Y ˚
λ,n
“
mnÿ
i“1
I˚
λ,n,i
1Bi,n ,
where, for i “ 1, ...,mn,
I˚
λ,n,i
:“ min
”
X,max
´
0,X ´ dλ,n,i
¯ı
and
dλ,n,i :“W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1 `
λαi,n
˘
Lemma E.2. For each n P N, and for each i0 P t1, 2, ...,mnu, I
˚
λ,n,i0
is either a full insurance contract
or a deductible contract (with a strictly positive deductible) on the set Bi0,n.
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Proof. Fix n P N, and fix i0 P t1, 2, ...,mnu. If αi0,n ą 0 and λ ď u
1 pW0 ´Πq {αi0,n, then since u
1 is
decreasing (u is concave) it follows that pu1q´1
`
λαi0,n
˘
ěW0 ´Π. Therefore, pu
1q´1
`
λαi0,n
˘
´W0 `
Π`X ě X ě 0, and so I˚
λ,n,i0
“ X, a full insurance contract (on Bi0,n).
If αi0,n “ 0, then I
˚
λ,n,i0
“ min
”
X,max
´
0, pu1q´1 p0q `X ´W0 `Π
¯ı
. But pu1q´1 p0q “ `8, by
Assumption 4.2. Therefore, pu1q´1 p0q ´W0 ` Π `X ě X ě 0, and so I
˚
λ,n,i0
“ X, a full insurance
contract (on Bi0,n).
If αi0,n ą 0 and λ ą u
1 pW0 ´Πq {αi0,n, then since u
1 is strictly decreasing (u is strictly concave)
it follows that pu1q´1
`
λαi0,n
˘
ă W0 ´ Π. Therefore, 0 ă W0 ´ Π ´ pu
1q´1
`
λαi0,n
˘
“ dλ,n,i0, and so
I˚
λ,n,i0
“
´
X ´ dλ,n,i0
¯`
, a deductible insurance contract (on Bi0,n) with a strictly positive deductible,
where for any a, b P R, pa´ bq` :“ max p0, a´ bq. 
Remark E.3. Hence, a sequence tY ˚
λ,n
un has been constructed that converges pointwise (on S and
hence on A) to Y ˚
λ
. Consequently, by Egoroff’s theorem [48, Theorem 9.6], for each ε ą 0, there exists
some Bε P Σ, Bε Ď A, with µ pAzBεq ă ε, such that tY
˚
λ,n
un converges to Y
˚
λ
uniformly on Bε. In
other words, for each ε ą 0, there is some Bε P Σ, Bε Ď A, with µ pAzBεq ă ε, and there is some
Nε P N such that for all n ě Nε, |Y
˚
λ,n
psq ´ Y ˚
λ
psq| ă ε{2n, for all s P Bε.
The following lemma is a direct consequence of Lemmata B.2 and B.7, and it is hence stated without
a proof.
Lemma E.4. If rY ˚
λ,n,µ
(resp. rY ˚
λ,µ
) denotes the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚
λ,n
(resp. Y ˚
λ
)
with respect to X, then trY ˚
λ,n,µ
un converges monotonically downwards and pointwise µ-a.s. to rY ˚λ,µ.
Moreover, rY ˚
λ,n,µ
“ rY ˚
λ,n,A,µ
, µ-a.s., where rY ˚
λ,n,A,µ
denotes the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of
Y ˚
λ,n,µ
with respect to X on A.
Let C2,n :“
!
s P S : Y ˚
λ,n
psq “ X psq
)
. Then C2,n is of the form
13 C2,n “ Bk1,n Y ... Y BkN ,n, for
some tk1, k2, ..., kN u Ď t1, 2, ...,mnu. Therefore,
Y ˚
λ,n
“
ÿ
jPJ
´
X ´ dλ,n,j
¯`
1Bj,n `X1C2,n
for J “ t1, 2, ...,mnuztk1, k2, ..., kN u.
Lemma E.5. Fix n P N. If there exists some i0 P t1, 2, . . . ,mnu such that αi0,n “ 0 and Bi0,nzts P
S : X psq “ 0u ‰ ∅, then C2,nzts P S : X psq “ 0u ‰ ∅.
Proof. Immediate, in light of the second paragraph in the proof of Lemma E.2. 
13Note that since the random loss X is a mapping of S onto the closed interval r0,Ms, it follows that ts P S : X psq “
0u ‰ ∅, as mentioned previously. Now, since 0 ď Yλ,n ď X, it follows that ∅ ‰ ts P S : X psq “ 0u Ď C2,n. Therefore,
C2,n ‰ ∅.
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Lemma E.6. If µ is not absolutely continuous with respect to ν, then for each n P N there is some
i0 P t1, 2, ...,mnu such that αi0,n “ 0.
Proof. Suppose, per contra, that µ is not absolutely continuous with respect to ν but that there is
some n P N such that αi0,n ą 0, for each i0 P t1, 2, ...,mnu. Then hn “
řmn
i“1 αi,n1Bi,n ą 0. But
the sequence thnun converges monotonically upwards, and pointwise, to h :“ dνac{dµ. Hence, since
hn ą 0, it follows that h psq ě hk psq ą 0, for each s P S and for each k ě n. Consequently, h ą 0.
Therefore µ and νac are mutually absolutely continuous (i.e. equivalent [13, p. 179]). Furthermore, the
finite measures ν, νac, and νs are nonnegative, and hence νac ! ν. Thus, µ ! ν, a contradiction. 
Lemma E.7. If µ “ ν then C2,nzts P S : X psq “ 0u “ ∅, for each n ě 1.
Proof. Suppose that µ “ ν. Then, in this case, νs “ 0, νac “ ν “ µ, and so h “ 1 and A “ S. Thus,
hn “ 1, for all n P N.
I claim that λ ą u1 pW0 ´Πq. Suppose, per contra, that λ ď u
1 pW0 ´Πq. Then by concavity of u,
u1 is decreasing, and so pu1q´1
`
λ
˘
ěW0 ´Π. Therefore,
Y ˚
λ
“ min
«
X,max
´
0,X ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1 `
λ
˘ı¯ﬀ
“ X,
contradicting the classical result that a deductible insurance contract, with a positive deductible, is
optimal in this case (as in Raviv [45] or Theorem 2.2). Therefore, λ ą u1 pW0 ´Πq. But then from
the proof of Lemma E.2 it follows that C2,nzts P S : X psq “ 0u “ ∅, for each n ě 1. 
Now, let C1,n :“
!
s P S : Y ˚
λ,n
psq “ 0
)
. Then C1,n is non-empty
14 and of the form C1,n “
C
piq
1,n Y C
piiq
1,n , where C
piq
1,n Ď C2,n and C
piiq
1,n Ď SzC2,n. Indeed, since
!
s P S : X psq “ 0
)
‰ ∅ and
0 ď Y ˚
λ,n
ď X, it follows that for all s P
!
s P S : X psq “ 0
)
one has Y ˚
λ,n
psq “ X psq “ 0. It is then
easily verified that
C
piq
1,n :“
!
s P C2,n : Y
˚
λ,n
psq “ 0
)
“
!
s P S : X psq “ 0
)
‰ ∅
Therefore, C1,n “
!
s P S : X psq “ 0
)
YC
piiq
1,n . Moreover, one can write C
piiq
1,n “
ŤkQ
j“kN`1
Bj,n, for some
tkN`1, ..., kQu Ď J . Letting J
1 :“ JztkN`1, ..., kQu, it follows that 0 ă
´
X ´ dλ,n,j
¯`
“ X ´ dλ,n,j ă
X, for each j P J 1. Therefore,
Y ˚
λ,n
“ 01C1,n `
ÿ
jPJ 1
´
X ´ dλ,n,j
¯
1Bj,n `X1C2,nztsPS:Xpsq“0u
One can assume, without loss of generality, that αj,n ă αk,n, for all j, k P J
1 such that j ă k. Then
it is easily verified that dλ,n,j ă dλ,n,k, because of the concavity of u.
Now, if rY ˚
λ,n,µ
denotes the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚
λ,n
with respect to X, one has the
following result:
14Since 0 ď Y ˚
λ,n
ď X and ts P S : X psq “ 0u ‰ ∅.
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Lemma E.8. Let rY ˚
λ,n,µ
denotes the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚
λ,n
with respect to X. There
exists an P r0,M s such that for µ-a.a. s P S,rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq “
"
0 if X psq P r0, anq
fn pX psqq if X psq P ran,M s
(E.1)
where fn : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s is a nondecreasing and Borel-measurable function such that 0 ď fn ptq ď t
for each t P r0,M s, and, for µ ˝X´1-a.a. t P r0,M s, one has f ptq ą 0 if t ą an.
Proof. First note that 0 ď rY ˚
λ,n,µ
ď X, by Lemma B.6, since 0 ď Y ˚
λ,n
ď X, by definition of Y ˚
λ,n
.
Moreover, one has Y ˚
λ,n
“ Iλ,n ˝ X, for some Borel-measurable function Iλ,n : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s.
Therefore, rY ˚
λ,n,µ
“ rI˚
λ,n
˝ X, where rI˚n is the nondecreasing µ ˝ X´1-rearrangement of Iλ,n. Let
fn :“ rI˚λ,n. Then 0 ď fn ptq ď t, for each t P r0,M s, and fn : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s is nondecreasing and
Borel-measurable. Now, note that
µ
´ 
s P S : Y ˚
λ,n
psq ď 0
(¯
“ µ
´ 
s P S : Y ˚
λ,n
psq “ 0
(¯
“ µ pC1,nq
“ µ
´ 
s P S : Y ˚
λ,n
psq ď 0,X psq “ 0
(¯
` µ
´ 
s P S : Y ˚
λ,n
psq ď 0,X psq ą 0
(¯
“ µ
´ 
s P S : X psq “ 0
(¯
` µ
`
Cii1,n
˘
“ µ
`
Cii1,n
˘
where the last equality follows form the nonatomicity of µ ˝ X´1 (Assumption 4.4). Moreover, by
equimeasurability, one has that
µ
´ 
s P S : Y ˚
λ,n
psq ď 0
(¯
“ µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
ď 0
(¯
However,
µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq ď 0
(¯
“ µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq “ 0
(¯
“ µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq ď 0,X psq “ 0
(¯
` µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq ď 0,X psq ą 0
(¯
“ µ
´ 
s P S : X psq “ 0
(¯
` µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq “ 0,X psq ą 0
(¯
“ µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq “ 0,X psq ą 0
(¯
where the last equality follows form the nonatomicity of µ ˝X´1 (Assumption 4.4). Consequently,
µ pC1,nq “ µ
`
Cii1,n
˘
“ µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq “ 0, X psq ą 0
(¯
Thus, if µ
`
Cii
1,n
˘
‰ 0, then there exists an ą 0 such that for µ-a.a. s P S, rY ˚λ,n,µ psq “ 0 if X psq
belongs to r0, ans or r0, anq, and rY ˚λ,n,µ psq ą 0 if X psq ą an. Therefore, fn ptq ą 0 if t ą an, for
µ ˝X´1-a.a. t P r0,M s.
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If µ
`
Cii
1,n
˘
“ 0, then µ
´ 
s P S : rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq “ 0, X psq ą 0
(¯
“ 0, and so for µ-a.a. s P S,rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq “ 0 if X psq “ 0, and rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq ą 0 if X psq ą 0. Thus, with an “ 0, rY ˚λ,n,µ is µ-a.s. of the
form equation (E.1), with fn ptq ą 0 if t ą an “ 0, for µ ˝X
´1-a.a. t P r0,M s. 
Remark E.9. For each n ě 1, let En P Σ be the event such that µ pEnq “ 1 and rY ˚λ,n,µ is of the form
equation (E.1) on En. Let E :“
Ş`8
n“1En. Then E P Σ and, by Lemma A.2, µ pEq “ 1. Moreover, for
each s P E, and for each n ě 1, rY ˚
λ,n,µ
psq is given by equation (E.1).
By Lemma E.4, the sequence trY ˚
λ,m,µ
um defined by equation (E.1) converges pointwise µ-a.s. torY ˚
λ,µ
, the nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚
λ
with respect to X.
Now, let Y ˚
4,β be an optimal solution to Problem D.4 with parameter β, as defined previously, and
for each m P N let rY ˚m,β :“ rY ˚λ,m,µ1A ` Y ˚4,β1SzA
Finally, let β˚ be optimal for Problem D.5, let λ˚ be chosen for β˚ just as λ was chosen for β, and
let Y ˚
4,β˚ be a corresponding optimal solution for Problem D.4 with parameter β
˚. For each n ě 1, letrY ˚m,β˚ :“ rY ˚λ˚,m,µ1A ` Y ˚4,β˚1SzA
Then, by Remark D.8, the sequence trY ˚m,β˚um converges pointwise µ-a.s. to an optimal solution of
the initial problem (Problem 6.1), which is µ-a.s. nondecreasing in the loss X. Henceforth, Y˚ will
denote that optimal solution. Then
(E.2) Y˚1A “ rY ˚λ˚,µ1A
To conclude the proof of Corollary 6.3, it will now be shown that the optimal solution Y˚ to Problem
6.1 obtained above has the form of a generalized deductible contract, µ-a.s. That is, it will be shown
that rY ˚λ˚,µ has the form of a generalized deductible contract, µ-a.s.
Recall that rY ˚λ˚,µ is the µ-a.s. unique nondecreasing µ-rearrangement of Y ˚λ˚ with respect to X,
where
Y ˚λ˚ :“ min
«
X,max
´
0, Yλ˚
¯ﬀ
and
Yλ˚ :“ X ´W0 `Π`
`
u1
˘´1
pλ˚hq
Moreover, the sequence tYλ˚,mum, defined by
Yλ˚,m :“ X ´W0 `Π`
`
u1
˘´1
pλ˚hmq ,
converges pointwise to Yλ˚ . Since the sequence thmum converges monotonically upwards and pointwise
to h, and since pu1q´1 is continuous and decreasing, it follows that the sequence tYλ˚,mum converges
monotonically downwards and pointwise to Yλ˚ . Consequently, one can easily check that the sequence
tY ˚λ˚,mum converges monotonically downwards and pointwise to Y
˚
λ˚ , where for each m ě 1,
Y ˚λ˚,m :“ min
«
X,max
´
0, Yλ˚,m
¯ﬀ
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Remark E.10. For each m ě 1, let rY ˚λ˚,m,µ denote the µ-a.s. unique nondecreasing µ-rearrangement
of Y ˚λ˚,m with respect to X. Then by Lemma B.7, the sequence t
rYλ˚,m,µum converges monotonically
downwards and pointwise µ-a.s. to rYλ˚,µ. That is, there is some A˚ P Σ with A˚ Ď A and µ pA˚q “ 1,
such that for each s P A˚ the sequence trYλ˚,m,µ psqum converges monotonically downwards to rYλ˚,µ psq.
Now, as in Lemma E.8, for µ-a.a. s P S,
rY ˚λ˚,n,µ psq “ " 0 if X psq P r0, anqfn pX psqq if X psq P ran,M s
for a given an ě 0, and fn : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s, a nondecreasing and Borel-measurable function such
that 0 ď fn ptq ď t for each t P r0,M s, and f ptq ą 0 if t ą an for µ ˝X
´1-a.a. t P r0,M s.
Lemma E.11. The sequence tamum is bounded and nondecreasing.
Proof. Since tamum Ă r0,M s, boundedness of the sequence tamum is clear. I now show that it is
nondecreasing. Fix m P N. Since the sequence trYλ˚,m,µum is nonincreasing pointwise on A˚ (as in
Remark E.10), one has rYλ˚,m,µ psq ě rYλ˚,m`1,µ psq, for each s P A˚.
To show that am ď am`1, first note that if am “ 0, then am`1 ě 0 “ am. If am ą 0, let E P Σ be
as in Remark E.9, let A˚ P Σ be as in Remark E.10, and choose s P E XA˚ such that X psq P r0, amq.
Then 0 “ rYλ˚,m,µ psq ě rYλ˚,m`1,µ psq ě 0, and so rYλ˚,m`1,µ psq “ 0. Consequently, X psq P r0, am`1s,
and so r0, amq Ď r0, am`1s. Therefore, 0 ă am ď am`1. 
Hence, the sequence tamum is bounded and monotone. Therefore, it has a limit. Let
(E.3) a :“ lim
mÑ`8
am
Moreover, if there is some n ě 1 such that an ą 0, then for each m ě n, one has am ě an ą 0.
Lemma E.12. With a as defined in eq. (E.3) above, one has 0 ď a ďM , and a ą 0 if there is some
n ě 1 with an ą 0.
Proof. Since 0 ď am ď M , for each m ě 1, it follows that 0 ď a ď M . Moreover, if there is some
n ě 1 such that an ą 0, then for each m ě n one has am ě an ą 0. Therefore, a ě am ą 0, for each
m ě n, and so a ą 0. 
Lemma E.13. There exist a˚ ě 0 such that for µ-a.a. s P S,
Y˚ psq “
"
0 if X psq P r0, a˚q
f pX psqq if X psq P ra˚,M s
for some nondecreasing, left-continuous, and Borel-measurable function f : r0,M s Ñ r0,M s such that
0 ď f ptq ď t for each t P ra˚,M s.
Proof. Let a˚ :“ a, where a “ lim
mÑ`8
am, as above, let E P Σ be as in Remark E.9, let A
˚ P Σ
be as in Remark E.10, and let E˚ :“ E X A˚. Suppose that there exists some s1 P E
˚ such that
X ps1q P r0, a
˚q, but Y˚ ps1q ą 0. Then for each m ě 1 one has rYλ˚,m,µ ps1q ą 0, since the sequence
trYλ˚,m,µum converges monotonically downwards and pointwise on E˚ to rYλ˚,µ and Y˚1E˚ “ rY ˚λ˚,µ1E˚ ,
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by definition of Y˚. Consequently, X ps1q ě am, for each m ě 1. Therefore, X ps1q ě a
˚ “ a “
lim
mÑ`8
am, a contradiction. Hence, for each s P E
˚, X psq P r0, a˚q ñ Y˚ psq “ 0. Also, since
µ pEq “ µ pA˚q “ 1, it follows form Lemma A.2 that µ pE˚q “ 1.
Moreover, rY ˚λ˚,µ “ rI ˝X, for some bounded, nonnegative, nondecreasing, left-continuous, and Borel-
measurable function rI on the range r0,M s of X (see Section B.1). Let f :“ rI. One then has, for
each s P E˚, Y˚ psq “ f pX psqq if X psq P ra˚,M s. Furthermore, since 0 ď rY ˚λ˚,µ ď X, it follows that
0 ď f ptq ď t, for each t P r0,M s. In particular, f p0q “ 0. This completes the proof of Corollary
6.3. 
Remark E.14. I have mentioned that the function f that appears in Corollary 6.3 can be charac-
terized. Indeed, the optimal solution appearing in Corollary 6.3 has been constructed as the limit of
a sequence of rearrangements of nonnegative functions (each bounded by M :“ }X}sup). For ease of
notation, l will refer to the initial sequence as pkmqmě1, so that the sequence
´rkm¯
mě1
of nondecreas-
ing rearrangements converges to the optimal solution appearing in Corollary 6.3. Now each element
km of the initial sequence can in turn be approximated by a nondecreasing sequence tlm,iuiě1 of Σ-
simple nonnegative functions. Moreover, Ghossoub [26] completely characterizes the nondecreasing
rearrangement of simple functions, and hence it is possible to completely characterize the nonde-
creasing rearrangement rlm,i of each one of these simple functions lm,i. Each sequence trlm,iuiě1 of
nondecreasing simple functions hence obtained converges to the nondecreasing rearrangement rkm of
each element km of the initial sequence tkmumě1 (by Lemma B.8).
Appendix F. Sufficient Conditions for a˚ ą 0
This section gives some sufficient conditions for the a˚ appearing in Corollary 6.3 (eq. (6.2) on p.
18) – or Lemma E.13 – to be strictly positive. First, note that If there is some n ě 1 such that an ą 0,
then a ą 0 by Lemma E.12 – where a is defined in eq. (E.3) – and hence it follows from the definition
of a˚ that a˚ ą 0.
Lemma F.1. There exists an event E˚ P Σ such that µ pE˚q “ 1, and a˚ ą 0 when µ pDE˚q ‰ 0,
where:
(i) DE˚ :“
!
s0 P E
˚ : X ps0q ą 0, h ps0q ą 0,
ş
E˚
Y˚ h dµ ă L ps0q
)
; and,
(ii) L ps0q :“
ş
E˚
min
”
X,max
´
0,X ´
”
W0 ´Π´ pu
1q´1
´
u1pW0´Π´Xps0qq
hps0q
h
¯ı¯ı
h dµ.
Finally, there exists κ P R` such that a˚ ą 0 when µ pEE˚q ‰ 0, where:
EE˚ :“
#
s0 P E
˚ : h ps0q ą 0, κ h ps0q ą u
1 pW0 ´Πq ,
0 ă X ps0q ăW0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
pκ h ps0qq
+(F.1)
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Proof. Let E P Σ be as in Remark E.9, let A˚ P Σ be as in Remark E.10, and let E˚ :“ E X A˚, as
above. Then µ pE˚q “ 1, by Lemma A.2. For each s0 P E
˚, define L ps0q by:
L ps0q :“
ż
E˚
min
„
X,max
ˆ
0,X ´
„
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1ˆu1 pW0 ´Π´X ps0qq
h ps0q
h
˙˙
h dµ
Then
L ps0q “
ż
A
min
„
X,max
ˆ
0,X ´
„
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1ˆu1 pW0 ´Π´X ps0qq
h ps0q
h
˙˙
h dµ
Now, let
DE˚ :“
!
s0 P E
˚ : X ps0q ą 0, h ps0q ą 0,
ż
E˚
Y ˚ h dµ ă L ps0q
)
Then
DE˚ “
!
s0 P E
˚ : X ps0q ą 0, h ps0q ą 0,
ż
A
Y ˚ h dµ ă L ps0q
)
Suppose that µ pDE˚q ‰ 0. Then, in particular, DE˚ ‰ ∅. Fix some s0 P DE˚ . Then X ps0q ą 0,
h ps0q ą 0, and
ş
A
Y˚ h dµ ă L ps0q. In other words,
β˚ “ φ pλ˚q “
ż
A
Y˚ h dµ ă φ
´
u1 pW0 ´Π´X ps0qq
M
h ps0q
¯
“ L ps0q .
Therefore, λ˚ ě u1 pW0 ´Π´X ps0qq
M
h ps0q, since φ is a nonincreasing function. Consequently,
X ps0q ďW0 ´Π´ pu
1q´1 pλ˚h ps0qq, and so
Y ˚λ˚ ps0q “ min
«
X ps0q ,max
´
0,X ps0q ´
”
W0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
pλ˚h ps0qq
ı¯ﬀ
“ 0
Hence, for each s0 P DE˚ , one has X ps0q ą 0 and Y
˚
λ˚ ps0q “ 0. Since µ pDE˚q ‰ 0 by hypothesis,
it follows that
µ
˜!
s P E˚ : X psq ą 0, Y ˚λ˚ psq “ 0
)¸
‰ 0
Thus, the fact that in this case one has a˚ ą 0 follows from the properties of the equimeasurable
rearrangement (recall equation (E.2) and the proof of Lemma E.8).
Now, let κ “ λ˚, and define the set EE˚ as follows:
EE˚ :“
#
s0 P E
˚ : h ps0q ą 0, κ h ps0q ą u
1 pW0 ´Πq ,
0 ă X ps0q ăW0 ´Π´
`
u1
˘´1
pκ h ps0qq
+
Suppose that µ pEE˚q ‰ 0. Then, in particular, EE˚ ‰ ∅. Fix some s0 P EE˚ . Then h ps0q ą 0,
λ˚ ą u1 pW0 ´Πq {h ps0q, X ps0q ą 0, and X ps0q ă W0 ´ Π ´ pu
1q´1 pλ˚h ps0qq. Since the sequence
thnun of nonnegative, µ-simple functions on pS,Σq previously defined converges pointwise to h, one
can choose n large enough so that hn ps0q is close enough to h ps0q and the following hold:
(1) hn ps0q ą 0;
(2) λ˚ ą u1 pW0 ´Πq {hn ps0q; and,
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(3) 0 ă X ps0q ăW0 ´Π´ pu
1q´1 pλ˚hn ps0qq.
Therefore, from the proof of Lemma E.2 (third paragraph), one has X ps0q ą 0 and Y
˚
λ˚,n ps0q “ 0.
Since µ pEE˚q ‰ 0 by hypothesis, it follows that
µ
˜!
s P E˚ : X psq ą 0, Y ˚λ˚,n psq “ 0, for some n ě 1
)¸
‰ 0
Thus, there exists n˚ ě 1 such that µ
´ 
s P E˚ : X psq ą 0, Y ˚λ˚,n˚ psq “ 0
(¯
‰ 0. For such n˚, one
has an˚ ą 0 by properties of the equimeasurable rearrangement (as in the proof of Lemma E.8), and
by definition of the function rY ˚λ˚,n˚,µ given in equation (E.1). This then yields a ą 0 (by Lemma E.12)
and so a˚ ą 0. 
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